A Comprehensive Assessment of Gangs in North Carolina: A Report to the General Assembly

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Executive Summary

The North Carolina Governor’s Crime Commission, and its Criminal Justice Analysis Center, has investigated and researched the issue of gangs and gang activity since 1998. In that time the Commission has produced numerous reports and provided federal and state funds to local agencies to prevent, intervene and suppress local gangs and their criminal activities. In 2007, the General Assembly requested a comprehensive statewide gang assessment and directed the Commission to report its findings and recommendations back to the legislature by March 15, 2008.

Numerous strategies were used to sufficiently address all of the study directives. The Commission’s prior gang survey instruments were updated to include general information on the nature and extent of gang activity, as well as questions regarding the types of gang programs within the respondent’s jurisdiction. Existing gang literature was reviewed and interviews with key state personnel were conducted, and a secondary programmatic survey was administered in order to provide a more comprehensive assessment of both the national and state gang situation.

Key findings from a survey of law enforcement personnel include the following:

80 percent reported that one or more gangs were currently active in their jurisdictions.
The number of active gangs ranged from one to 219 with an average of eleven different gangs per jurisdiction. A total of 1,446 gangs were reported in 64 counties.

The survey also asked respondents to provide specific detailed information about each active gang in their jurisdiction including demographics, types of criminal activity, the extent of organizational complexity, identifying features as well as the number of gang members. Detailed information was provided for 766 distinct groups.

To be consistent with the Commission’s prior gang research, and to enhance study reliability and validity, a three pronged definition of a gang was adopted based upon prior gang research by Malcolm Klein (1995). This definition includes the following: A gang is 1) a group of three or more individuals with 2) a unique name and other identifying attributes who 3) demonstrate a commitment to crime as evidenced by prior and/or current substantiated criminal activity.

Eliminating those gangs that did not meet all three criteria reduced the number to 550 gangs across 62 counties. The number of gangs per county ranged from one to 54 with the average county having nine gangs. Combined, these 550 gangs have a total of 14,500 members with the average gang consisting of 26 members.

The study also examined the number of gangs that possessed ties with other out-of-state groups or with larger organized gangs. Nearly 82 percent, or 449 gangs, were reputed to have links with larger groups or with gangs outside of the state. Thirty percent or 134 gangs were purported to have primary ties with other Blood sets while 17 percent were reported as being connected to other Crip sets. Ties with other Hispanic gangs were also reported with 21 percent being connected in this manner. Seventeen percent had ties with two larger or out of state gangs while 4 percent were identified as being connected to three other larger or out of state groups.
Of the 161 survey respondents 116 were able to provide information regarding the extent to which gangs in their area possessed ties to organized crime groups. Nearly one-half answered that some of their gangs do indeed interact with other organized crime groups.

Gang members ranged from six to 70 years old with the average age of the youngest member being 15 and the average age of the oldest member being 27. The most frequently reported age of the youngest member was 15 and the most frequently reported age of the oldest member was 25. Of the 520 gangs for which age data were available 30 were exclusively youth gangs.

The most commonly reported crime was drug possession (65%) followed by vandalism (62%), assaults (58%) and weapons related offenses (53%). Only a few gangs were involved with sexual assault and motor vehicle theft. Other criminal activities which were perpetrated by a substantially low number of gangs included: financial crime, trespassing, intimidation, arson, armed robbery and kidnapping.

Eighty-seven percent of the law enforcement respondents acknowledged a gang presence within their respective jurisdictions or double the percentage that acknowledged the presence of gangs in the original 1999 study.
Fifty-eight respondents noted that their agencies currently have operational gang units with the number of assigned officers ranging from one to 14 with the typical gang unit possessing three officers. More than three-quarters (79%) of the respondents reported that these officers have received specialized training for identifying gangs and for intervening in their criminal activities. The data indicates that the number of law enforcement agencies with established gang units has risen since 2004 in which only 15 percent of the responding agencies had such units. Findings from the original 1999 study reveal that less than 10 percent of the responding agencies had gang units nine years ago.

Fifty-two percent of the agencies actively track and monitor gang activities with a slightly higher percentage (66%) reporting that they compile additional intelligence data on individual gang members.

As of September 2007, only 37 percent of the responding agencies were using the GangNet database system with an additional 78 percent having plans to join this network in the future.

GangNet is an Internet based law enforcement intelligence sharing database which houses information about known gang members that have been entered by law enforcement agencies and who have been validated by meeting at least 2 of 11 criteria for gang membership or who have self-reported their gang membership. Information in this database is populated statewide by member law enforcement agencies and in a second phase, Department of Correction data will be included.
The GangNet database includes photographs of individuals, tattoos, graffiti, homes and other locations, automobiles, offenses, and other related data entered into the system. Once this system is fully populated and current across the state, law enforcement, courts and corrections (jails, probation, and prison system) will better be able to determine the gang status of individuals who are being investigated or are in custody.

Prison population data indicate that nearly six percent, of the population on June 30, 2007, were known security threat group members. Data for the same period in 2004 indicate that 1.4 percent of the population had been identified as security threat group members; thus the percentage of known threat group members has increased each year since 2004 with a spike occurring between 2006, with 3.4 percent, to the current 5.5 percent. Additional data indicate that approximately two percent of the incoming new prisoners acknowledge gang membership at intake.

To better address increasing security concerns brought about by gangs the Division of Prisons employed the Security Threat Group Management Unit (STGMU) at Foothills Correctional Institution in Morganton, N.C., in July of 2005.

The goal of the (STGMU) is to establish a structured program that provides the inmate with educational, social and cognitive skills that is designed to instill self-discipline and promote respect for others by establishing goals and objectives for each inmate with the ultimate goal being disassociation from Security Threat Groups and reintegration at designated facilities consistent with custody classification. The program provides a non-punitive, close-custody assignment that provides sufficient supervision to ensure appropriate safety and security for both staff and inmates.

Other state agencies have also responded to the gang issue with the Department of Public Instruction, School Safety and Climate Section, having been involved in providing gang prevention awareness activities to
Local Education Agency Safe and Drug Free School staff, external partners and 21st Century Community Learning Center afterschool programs over the years. Each of the activities stressed the impact gang involvement has on the overall well-being of North Carolina’s students and how these gang-related associations influence academic performance.

The North Carolina Department of Justice, through its Justice Academy, conducted eight youth gang awareness courses during fiscal year 2006/2007 which were held at both the Salemburg and Edneyville campuses. A total of 134 participants attended these training sessions and represented 63 different law enforcement agencies including police departments, campus security and law enforcement agencies as well as sheriffs’ offices. Staff also coordinated the North Carolina Gang Investigators Association’s Conference which was held in the later part of October and early November of 2006. This conference hosted 348 attendees.

While there is no single, definitive and comprehensive study or meta-analysis which identifies best practices, for managing gangs and gang related criminal activity, significant gang prevention, intervention and suppression programs were highlighted in this report with an emphasis on identifying effective and promising practices for each of these program types.

A similar strategy was also conducted in an effort to identify successful gang programs and practices here in North Carolina. Many of the gang specific programs in North Carolina are in an infancy stage. Currently, the majority of these programs seem to either be collecting data or are planning to collect data in the future. Due to the newness of these programs data on program activities and results, both short-term and long-term, are either incomplete or simply unknown. Therefore, the effectiveness of these programs cannot be accurately assessed to date.
Nevada, California and Florida have all addressed their respective gang problems through stringent legislation and penalty enhancements for offenders with the research on the effectiveness and efficacy of increasing penalties, to prevent, deter and mitigate gang activity, being scant with study findings being mixed or inconclusive.

In short, we simply don’t know if gangbuster type bills actually deter gang crime. Research on the use of civil injunctions was also included and suggests some modest success in limited areas.

Data from the Commission’s prior 1999 and 2004 research studies, as well as data from the current 2007 law enforcement survey, were used to produce estimates of future gang involvement and to extrapolate a statewide projection for 2012. The limited data indicates there could be more than 41,300 gang members in North Carolina in 2012. Operating under a more conservative model produced an estimate of slightly more than 29,000 gang members.

The gang situation in North Carolina appears to be at a crossroads with a greater awareness and increased reporting of gang activity, on the part of law enforcement, yet the majority of the state’s recognized gangs do not appear to be as problematic as gangs that have become institutionalized as found in Los Angeles, Chicago and other major cities across the country. Drug related offenses and vandalism continue to be the most commonly occurring offenses which are associated with the gangs identified in this study as well as those identified in the Analysis Center’s earlier research. While national survey data indicate a leveling off in the number of gangs and gang members data suggest that North Carolina may be lagged in this respect and has not experienced a plateau effect yet (National Youth Gang Center, 2007). This produces a promising opportunity to address the gang issue cautiously without denial and without undue panic. Policy makers and criminal justice practitioners
across the state must utilize and benefit from the successes and avoid the pitfalls and failures that other jurisdictions have encountered in their past efforts to confront and mitigate gangs and gang activities.

Based on this research, prior data and the existing gang literature the following policy recommendations are offered in an effort to help North Carolina’s communities address their respective gang issues in a balanced and more informed fashion.

1. Emphasize the necessity of strong community planning, collaboration and coordination.

2. Gang programs should be comprehensive in scope and include suppression, prevention and intervention components.

3. Funding for gang programs should be proactive and data driven.

4. Improve both the quality and quantity of program data.

5. Utilize and incorporate effective practices and evidence based knowledge into program design.

6. Explore funding opportunities for fully expanding and implementing GangNet across the entire state and for its recurring operations.
Introduction/Study Rationale

The North Carolina Governor’s Crime Commission, and its Criminal Justice Analysis Center, has investigated and researched the issue of gangs and gang activity in the state since 1998. In that time the Commission has produced numerous reports and provided federal and state funds to local agencies to prevent, intervene and suppress local gangs and their criminal activities. In 2007, the General Assembly requested a comprehensive statewide gang assessment and directed the Commission to study the following policy issues and report its findings and salient recommendations back to the legislature by March 15, 2008. Specifically the Commission was asked to:

1. Assess gang activity in communities known to have gangs, including any connections between gang activity and organized crime.
2. Consult with the Department of Correction to assess gang activity in the state's prisons.
3. Consult with the Department of Public Instruction, Department of Justice and the Department of Correction on any gang prevention initiatives they have in place or have administered in the past.
4. Summarize significant gang prevention, intervention and suppression programs that have been administered by local law enforcement, state agencies, local governments and community-based organizations and evaluate those programs for effectiveness.
5. Review accepted best practices in gang prevention and evaluate whether or not increasing penalties will mitigate gang activity.
6. Project the growth of gang activity over the next five years and identify
the locations where that growth is expected to occur.

7. Provide recommendations on ways to use state and local resources to improve the effectiveness of future gang prevention initiatives.

Methods

Numerous strategies or methodologies were used to sufficiently address all of the study directives. First, the Commission’s prior gang survey instruments were updated to include general information on the nature and extent of gang activity as well as questions regarding the types of gang programs within the respondent’s jurisdiction. More specific questions were asked to capture data on each active gang including known affiliation or relationship with other gangs and organized criminal groups, the number of active members and the demographical composition of the gang, leadership, types of criminal activity, and other identifying attributes.

Surveys were mailed to all local law enforcement agencies in North Carolina including 100 sheriffs’ offices and 400 police departments. The goal was to obtain at least one response from each of the state’s 100 counties in order to portray a true statewide assessment of gangs and their related activities across the state. Data from the National Drug Intelligence Center were also analyzed and incorporated in an effort to supplement survey results and provide a more valid and complete snapshot of gangs across the state. Secondary surveys were developed to obtain major performance measurement data on program impact and program operations and were administered to all programs as identified in the primary law enforcement survey plus programs which were active GCC and Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention grant recipients as well as programs which were identified by e-mail correspondence with the state’s chief juvenile court counselors in
each district.

Performance measures, for the secondary survey, were selected from recognized and recommended gang evaluation studies with process evaluation measures being derived from the Federal Office of Management and Budget’s PART or Program Assessment Rating Tool (United States Office of Management and Budget, 2007).

Next, personal interviews were conducted with key employees from the Departments of Correction, Public Instruction and Justice to gather information about how these state agencies have responded in the past, and to learn how they are currently addressing gangs within the state’s prisons, schools and communities. Emphasis was placed upon identifying gang prevention programming initiatives that these agencies have implemented or are planning to initiate in the near future. Information was also obtained from the Department of Correction to provide a snapshot of the current gang, or threat group, situation within the state’s prisons.

An extensive and exhaustive literature review was conducted in order to identify both strengths and weaknesses of existing gang programs, that have been implemented by state and local agencies as well as private foundations and other community groups, and to identify effective and promising practices for preventing, suppressing and intervening with gangs and gang activities.

Data from the Commission's 1999, 2004 and current survey, were used to project the growth of gang activity over the next five years and to ascertain where this growth may be the most pronounced (Yearwood and Hayes, 2000; Hayes, 2005).
Results

A total of 161 surveys were completed and returned by staff from local police departments and sheriffs’ offices for a response rate of 32 percent. These 161 agencies are located in 75 of the state’s 100 counties.

In addition, 352 programs were identified and surveyed with 28 percent of these programs responding. Of the completed surveys 37 percent were gang-specific programs whose sole mission is to target gang members and gang activities. Specifically, eight suppression programs, seven prevention programs, one intervention program and 21 combination programs, which included a combination of suppression, prevention and intervention objectives, were identified and subjected to a more in-depth assessment or evaluation process.

Definitions of a Gang

The first problem is defining what a gang is and who counts as a gang member. The National Youth Gang Center survey asks law enforcement personnel to identify youth gangs as “a group of youths or young adults in your jurisdiction that you or other responsible persons in your agency or community are willing to identify as a gang” (NYGC, 2007). Such a definition lacks objective criteria and subjects itself severely to personal opinion and an overestimation of numbers. Law enforcement personnel may, or may not, include groups such as prison and motorcycle gangs, hate groups, and any number of unsupervised teen groups.

Even with a variety of legitimate gang types, most communities with gang

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1. Numerous exceptional programs exist in North Carolina which target at-risk children and teens some of which may be gang members or become members in the future. However, these programs do not compile or disaggregate their administrative and performance data by the client’s gang status. Thus, evaluating these programs and their effect on gang members is precluded by this data limitation. Consequently, this study focused on gang specific programs only.
problems intend to focus on youth street gangs, whether they define them as such or not. North Carolina researchers Frabutt and Buford (2006) conclude that a gang “is a group or association of three or more persons who may have a name and who individually or collectively engage in, or have engaged in, criminal activity which creates an atmosphere of fear and intimidation”.

In spite of any disagreement amongst researchers, there must at least be agreement within communities so agencies can work together to properly target gang members. Ideally, a common definition should be agreed upon state-wide for better longitudinal program comparisons, as well as cross-implementation of effective programs.

A clear definition also allows for more consistent data collection. Problems with definitions and data have caused past programs to either over or under-report results, thus further obscuring the effectiveness of the program as well.

**The rise in gangs, gang membership and gang related crimes**

Has there been an increase in gangs, membership and gang crime? There is no short answer to this question; likewise there is little empirical evidence to indicate a rise in any of the three. To the contrary, some national studies indicate that the numbers of gang members is declining. In North Carolina, the largest increases can be shown in Hispanic/Latino gang membership however, this is slightly down over the past 3 years.

Some of the contributing factors that drive the impression that gangs are increasing include:

1. Too many years of denial. A decade ago, when the first Governor’s Crime Commission gang study was conducted, it was apparent that most jurisdictions denied there was any type of gang problem in their communities; however they did acknowledge a gang presence. We suggested at that time to “deny the denial” and acknowledge the presence of gangs in our state’s
2. Increases in acceptance of gangs as a problem. More recently communities have acknowledged that gang activities were problems in some areas. Law enforcement agencies formed “gang units” and trained officers to recognize gang related activities. With these newly trained officers came an awareness of the extent of the problem so long ignored. This does not constitute a growth but a recognition of what already existed.

3. Through the North Carolina Gang Investigator’s Association a new network of well trained officers was formed to aid neighboring communities and help them recognize the presence of gangs in their communities. Members of this organization also provide community awareness presentations and provide news media with information on gang activities. With more public awareness comes an increased sensitivity to gang related activities.

4. Governor’s Crime Commission studies and other studies of gangs in North Carolina have increasingly been afforded better responses from law enforcement on gang activities as their knowledge and willingness to acknowledge gangs in their communities has grown. This increased willingness to share information provides new figures on the levels of gang presence in the state thus adding to the aggregate numbers published.

5. Specialized gang units provide better intelligence. Once thought of as a bunch of kids acting out and not deserving of law enforcement tracking, gangs and gang members are now documented. This allows law enforcement agencies to know a general count of gangs, gang members and their affiliates' activities. As recent as five years ago, many law enforcement agencies (Raleigh and Charlotte included) had little or no data on the gangs and gang members in their jurisdictions. Today, these communities.
and many other agencies are actively collecting intelligence data and entering this information into NC GangNet.

6. Media reports the number of gangs but may not explain what those numbers mean. While few dispute that gangs and gang membership are being more accurately counted and followed today, however without considering baseline information, it is inappropriate to report that gangs are on the rise. In most jurisdictions gang–related crimes account for a very small portion of crimes. While it is true there are tendencies toward violence and drug related crimes, this is far from overwhelming the criminal justice system.

7. In the GCC five year follow-up survey released in 2005, a dramatic increase in Hispanic gang membership was indicated. This occurred along with a rapid rise in the total Hispanic population in the state. The GCC and the National Drug Crime Intelligence Center both released studies on the Hispanic gang membership within North Carolina within two months of each other. These two studies provided much of the same information. With the rise in this population and the degree of anger that immigration issues generate, it is likely that Hispanic gang activities are magnified to some extent. However, there is a disproportionate level of gang membership among this population.

8. Until consistent records are kept on what constitutes a gang related crime it remains unclear that there has been a rise in such crimes. Some count if a crime is committed to further the gang as gang related, while others would also include a crime committed by a gang member even if the crime had nothing to do with furthering the gang and its activities. A report on gang crime by the Justice Policy Institute indicates that only a fraction of crimes committed in any jurisdiction would be gang related and that recognizing this should be a barometer for determining a need for
ordinances and laws aimed at gang related crime. The first step would be a uniform definition of what would constitute a gang related crime.

**The current gang situation in North Carolina and where gangs are located**

The number of gangs and gang members reported in the current survey is not a definitive and exact count and should not be misconstrued as representing a precise picture of gangs across the entire state. Data from the recent GCC survey provide a snapshot of gangs and gang members drawn from those agencies who responded to the survey and were able to provide data on the number of gangs and gang members within their respective jurisdictions.

Caution should also be exercised when comparing the results of this survey with prior survey data as any increases, or decreases, in the number of gangs and gang members could be attributable to a host of factors. These factors include an increase or decrease in the actual or
true number of gangs and gang members as a result of successful prevention, intervention and suppression activities. A heightened awareness on the part of law enforcement, stricter reporting or validation criteria for describing an individual as a gang member and differing response rates across numerous surveys and survey periods can also adversely affect comparisons.

As part of the law enforcement survey, respondents were asked how many gangs are currently active in their respective communities. For this particular question the respondents were not provided with any specific definition of what constitutes a gang; i.e. they were free to use local definitions or define gangs in any manner that suited their particular viewpoints or met their agency’s definitional criteria.

Of the 161 responding agencies 128, or 80 percent, reported that one or more gangs were currently active in their jurisdictions. The number of active gangs ranged from one to 219 with an average of eleven different gangs per jurisdiction. Fifty percent of these agencies reported more than four active gangs and 50 percent reported fewer than four gangs. Across the entire sample a total of 1,446 gangs were reported in 64 counties². Additional questions asked respondents to provide detailed information about each active gang in their jurisdiction including demographics, types of criminal activity, the extent of organizational complexity, identifying features as well as the number of gang members. Of the 1,446 identified gangs detailed information was provided for 766 distinct groups.

To be consistent with the Commission’s prior gang research and to enhance study reliability and validity a three pronged gang definition was adopted and derived based upon prior gang research as conducted by Malcolm Klein (1995). This definition includes the following: A gang is 1) a group of three or more individuals with 2) a unique name and other identifying attributes who 3) demonstrate a commitment to crime as evidenced by prior and/or current substantiated criminal activity.
Eliminating those gangs that did not meet all three criteria reduced the number to 550 gangs across 62 counties. The number of gangs meeting this definition ranged from one to 54 with the average county having 9 gangs (Refer to Figure 1).

Combined these 550 gangs have a total of 14,500 members with the average gang consisting of 26 members (Refer to Figure 2). It should be noted that 62 percent of the data on the number of members in each gang was based on law enforcement estimates while 38 percent of the information was derived from validated intelligence counts. Once GangNet becomes fully operational more reliable and valid data will be available for assessing the number of gangs and gang members.

Contrasted with the original 1999 GCC survey, which found an average gang size of 16 members, this finding suggests that either gangs are growing in size and/or law enforcement has expanded their definition of what constitutes a gang member to include those individuals that are on the fringe or peripheral boundaries of joining a gang; i.e. “wannabees”.

Conversely, more agencies may be employing validation techniques and consequently are identifying more true members than in years past. Weisel and Shelley (2004) note it could be a matter of greater attention being directed to the issue of gangs with more agencies reporting and counting gangs than in the past.

The following section delineates a detailed profile of these 550 gangs and 14,500 members with an emphasis on identifying patterns of criminal activity, demographical attributes of gang members, the extent of organizational complexity and their relationship to other gangs and

2. The Mecklenburg County Sheriff's Office reported 100 active gangs, however given the fact that this agency does not provide law enforcement or patrol coverage it is plausible that these gangs were also included in the number reported by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department. Thus in order to avoid duplication these gangs should be removed leaving a statewide total of 1,346. Similarly, the Gastonia Police Department reported 25 gangs with the Gaston County Sheriff's Office reporting 30. Removing 25 to avoid possible duplication leaves a remaining total of 1,321.
criminal organizations.

**The distinguishing features of North Carolina's gangs**

The amount of time that these gangs have been active in the community ranged from less than one month to a high of twenty years with the average gang in North Carolina having been in existence for about three years.

Respondents were asked to provide information concerning the extent to which their respective gangs possessed ties with other out of state groups or with larger organized gangs. Nearly 82 percent, or 449 gangs,

![Figure 2: Number of Reported Gang Members](image)

While the number of gangs reported in the survey that did not meet the strict definitional criteria of being a gang was nearly a 2 to 1 ratio to actual groups meeting the definition, these remain as groups worthy of being watched and intelligence maintained in the event they do cross the threshold and become a criminal gang. This again, begs the point of having a uniform definition of what constitutes a gang. NC GangNet provides what is likely the best tool in forcing gang validation when the information is entered into the database.

The chart below illustrates the differences between what is reported as being a gang and what has been validated as a gang. This further supports the need for a uniform definition of what constitutes a “gang.”

3. 25 cases existed in which the Sheriff’s Office reported a gang with the same name as reported by the city police department. Is this one gang or two separate gangs? For the purpose of this analysis these were managed as 2 different gangs with one operating in the city and one operating outside of the city limits.

4. As with the number of reported gangs several outliers, or extremely high or low values, can dramatically inflate or deflate the calculated average. The median and mode are more useful measures or better indicators in such cases. The median number of members in a gang was 14 with the most frequently reported number of members (mode) being 10 per gang.
were reputed to have these links with larger groups or with gangs outside of the state. Of those, 134 gangs were purported to have primary ties with other Blood sets and 76 gangs were reported as being connected to other Crip sets. Ties with other Hispanic gangs were also reported with 96 gangs being connected in this manner. Seventy-five gangs had ties with two larger or out of state gangs while 17 gangs were identified as being connected to three other larger or out of state groups.

Of the 161 respondents 116 were able to provide information regarding the extent to which the gangs in their jurisdictions possessed ties to organized crime groups. Nearly one-half answered that some of their gangs do indeed interact with other organized crime groups. Contrasted with the 2005 National Alliance of Gang Investigators Associations’ survey this percentage is substantially higher than the national average of 26 percent. As Figure 3 reveals these connections were reported to exist in 39 counties.

The exact type of organized crime groups and the nature and extent of these connections were not reported. However existing literature and research from this study suggest that the majority of these interactions probably involve other gangs as opposed to traditional Mafia type organizations. In a prior Analysis Center study on Hispanic gangs 77 percent of the identified gangs purportedly had connections with other gangs outside of their home jurisdictions (Rhyne and Yearwood, 2005). However, gang connections with Mexican drug traffickers have been exposed as well as connections with Asian and Russian organized crime syndicates across the country and in the south (National Alliance of Gang Investigators Associations, 2005).

**Links between Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Gangs in North Carolina**

The National Drug Intelligence Center (2007) was asked by three federal prosecutors in North Carolina to investigate the link between gangs and
Mexican drug trafficking organizations. In 2007, a draft of their report was provided to the GCC for review. Some of the key findings of this investigation revealed that there is only a limited link between some gangs in North Carolina and Mexican drug trafficking organizations or other larger organized crime syndicates. The researchers worked in depth at local law enforcement agencies to obtain the most accurate information available. Research findings included:

- Relationships between Mexican drug traffickers and gangs in North Carolina are typically based on personal, family, or limited criminal connections.
- Mexican drug traffickers in North Carolina do not appear to be making concerted efforts to recruit and employ gangs in their drug trafficking operations.
- Interaction between Mexican drug traffickers and gangs in North Carolina are increasing and are typically seller-buyer relationships.

No strong direct ties to Mexican drug trafficking organizations was found in an exhaustive study of North Carolina gangs conducted by the National Drug Intelligence Center in 2007.
However, Mexican drug traffickers also occasionally hire gang members for security during the transportation and distribution of illicit drug shipments into and throughout North Carolina.

- Mexican drug traffickers are increasingly supplying illicit drugs directly to North Carolina-based gangs for retail distribution; however these gangs are distributing the drugs independently and not as components of Mexican drug trafficking networks.

**How do gangs disseminate their message?**

Thirty-two percent, or 164 gangs, maintain a web based presence either through such providers as Yahoo, AOL or MySpace, or have their own Internet websites.

**The demographic features of gangs in North Carolina**

Gangs continue to be highly skewed along gender lines with 361 of the 550 gangs having an all male membership. Eleven all female gangs were reported with the remaining gangs having both male and female members. The percentage of mixed gangs dropped slightly from the 2004 survey findings.
The percentage of African-American gangs experienced the greatest increase rising from 33 percent, of the total in 2004, to 49 percent of the current sample. However, there was a drop in the percentage of Hispanic gangs from 28 percent to 20 percent. Mixed racial/ethnic gangs dropped slightly from 22 percent to 20 percent. Slight declines also occurred for the Caucasian and the Asian and Native American gangs.
Gang members ranged from six to 70 years old; the average age of the youngest member was 15 and the average age of the oldest member was 27. The most frequently reported age of the youngest member was 15 and the most frequently reported age of the oldest member was 25. Of the 520 gangs for which age data were available 30 gangs, or about 6 percent, were exclusively youth gangs.

While the organizational structure of the reported gangs varied 73 percent were described as having an organized leadership hierarchy compared to only 48 percent of those gangs reported in 2004. Figures 6A and 6B document the type of criminal activities that were associated with the 550 reported gangs. The most commonly reported crime was drug possession (65 percent) followed by vandalism (62%), assaults (58%) and weapons related offenses (53%). Only a few gangs were involved with sexual assault and motor vehicle theft. Similarly, there were only a few incidences of financial crime, trespassing, intimidation, arson, armed robbery and kidnapping.

It is important to note that criminal activities vary by gang member and gangs as a whole. Not all gang members offend at equal rates, indeed many gang members never commit criminal acts. Likewise, some gangs

North Carolina gangs have some level of organizational hierarchy, but are generally less structured than some of the traditional gangs as in California of Chicago. Some gang experts feel that this lack of strong formal organization lends itself to infighting and violent crimes by members wishing to prove themselves to gain status.
A severity of crime index was created to compare the seriousness of the

Drug possession and vandalism were the most common crimes committed by gang members in North Carolina. Weapons crimes and assaults were the most often noted violent crimes committed by gangs.

can be held accountable for a large proportion of crime while similar gangs, in other locations, will only be accountable for a smaller proportion of the total crime. The typical gang is loosely organized with membership constantly in flux and engages in cafeteria style crime – a little bit of drug using and selling, some vandalism, a smattering of larceny with an occasional assault or two on the side (Papachristos, 2005).

A severity of crime index was created to compare the seriousness of the
gangs’ criminal activities across those counties that reported a gang presence. Each of the ten crimes listed above was assigned a numerical ranking, based on its severity (Refer to Table 1). A cumulative score was calculated for each gang with these scores being aggregated and averaged by county.

For example: A gang that was reported to have been involved with murder and drug trafficking scored 16. Meanwhile, a second gang in the county was only associated with breaking and entering thus scoring four. Therefore, the average gang severity score for this county would be 10. The higher the average score, the more severe the gang criminality is in that particular county. It should be noted that this only measures crime severity and not crime prevalence or the frequency at which gangs commit crime.

The average gang crime severity score ranged from one to 27 with an average of 18.3. Thirty-three counties, or 53 percent, had severity scores
at or below the group average while the remaining 29 counties (47%) had an average severity score greater than the sample average of 18.3 (See Figure 7).

**Table 1**  
Severity of Crime Score Rankings  
2007 Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criminal Offense</th>
<th>Assigned Score or Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Assault</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon Offenses</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Trafficking</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Possession &amp; Sales</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breaking and Entering</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto Theft</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The number of reported specialized gang units within North Carolina’s police departments and Sheriff’s offices has increased dramatically over the past decade, from 12 in 1999 to 86 in our most recent survey. With this rise is an accompanying rise in the number of gangs and gang members where intelligence information is being documented. As these units populate the GangNet database with validated intelligence, future assessments of gang membership and activities within the state will be more accurate.

**Law enforcement response to the gang situation in North Carolina**

Eighty-seven percent of the respondents acknowledged a gang presence within their respective jurisdictions. Compared to the Analysis Center’s prior gang surveys the percentage of agencies officially acknowledging a gang presence has doubled since the original 1999 study in which only 43 percent acknowledged a gang presence. Slightly more than one-half of the agencies acknowledged that gangs had been present for one to three years while only 12 percent reported gangs as a long standing issue (Refer to Figure 8).

![Figure 8: Length of Time Acknowledging a Gang Presence 2007 Data](image)

Fifty-eight (38 percent) respondents noted that their agencies currently have operational gang units with the number of assigned officers ranging from one to 14 with the typical gang unit possessing three officers. More than three-quarters (79 percent) of the respondents reported that these officers have received specialized training for identifying gangs and for intervening in their criminal activities. The data indicates that the number of law enforcement agencies with established gang units has risen since 2004 in which only 15 percent of the responding agencies had such units. Findings from the original 1999 study reveal that less than 10 percent of the responding agencies had gang units nine years ago.
Seventy-six agencies (52 percent) actively track and monitor gang activities with a slightly higher percentage (66 percent) reporting that they compile additional intelligence data on individual gang members. By September 2007, only 52 (37 percent) of the responding agencies were currently using GangNet while an additional 73 (78 percent) indicated plans to join the network in the future.

While law enforcement agencies kept their own files on gang members and gang activities in their communities, there are now two free databases available to criminal justice agencies for tracking and sharing information statewide. North Carolina GangNet is proprietary software purchased for law enforcement agencies by the Governor’s Crime Commission and RISS Gang is provided by a nationwide law enforcement information sharing agency, the Regional Information Sharing System.

**North Carolina GangNet**

GangNet is an Internet based law enforcement intelligence sharing database that contains information about known gang members. Information is entered into the system on individuals who meet at least 2 of eleven validation criteria or who have self-reported their gang membership. However, some law enforcement agencies require more than two of the defined criteria to meet their internal definition of gang membership. Information in this database is populated statewide by member law enforcement agencies and in a second phase, Department of Correction data will be included. The GangNet database includes intelligence data as well as photographs of tattoos, graffiti, individuals, homes and other locations, automobiles and offense data. Once the system is fully populated law enforcement, courts and corrections (jails, probation, and prison system) will better be able to determine the gang status of individuals who are being investigated or are in custody. However, this is not an evidentiary database and information in NC
GangNet is solely for criminal justice intelligence and investigatory purposes.

**The Way GangNet Works**

Funded through grants from the Governor’s Crime Commission, GangNet has been available in Durham for several years. Durham was granted the primary license for the software and database by the vendor with annual licensing costs for Durham and any agencies that were added on. However, in 2006 the GCC pledged to develop GangNet statewide making it free to law enforcement and the North Carolina Department of Correction (DOC). The GCC determined there should be three nodes, or entry jurisdictions, with one central node to be stored on a dedicated server at the Fusion Center of the State Bureau of Investigation. The Durham County Sheriff’s Office houses the server for counties in the eastern part of the state while the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police house the server for the western part of the state.

These servers and databases are maintained by the respective agencies housing them. Both the eastern and western nodes upload several times a day to the central server. In phase two, the DOC data for security threat groups (STG) that has been gathered will be mapped from their OPUS database into the GangNet database via routine transfers to maintain current information. This will insure that DOC data may continue to be input into their OPUS system and that selected data from their system will be copied into NC GangNet. When this is complete, any gang member or security threat group member who has been entered into the system during the previous five years can be queried for many forms of intelligence information from any member agency account.

NC GangNet is a secure web based application utilizing a web interface for entry into a database allowing for real-time data to be available to other member agencies. Proper training is required for individuals before
they are provided login and password information. Individuals who are entered into NC GangNet will be deleted from the system after a period of five years if no further updates or intelligence information is added. This database is limited only by the agencies manpower to input individual gang member data, photos and narratives.

NC GangNet is completely controlled by North Carolina criminal justice agencies. Since it is an intelligence database and the contents cannot be used as evidence, information on juveniles and adults may be housed in the same viewing areas. North Carolina’s neighboring states cannot share certain information on 16 and 17 year-olds since they are juveniles in those states. However, North Carolina law enforcement agencies can share an abundance of information and photographs on the movements and associations of known gang members, regardless of age.

The major drawback of NC GangNet is the hours of time involved in entering the data collected by field officers. Some agencies have data entry personnel, while others depend on the gang officers to enter their field notes.

Additionally, once new agencies are trained and added to the system and the Department of Correction data is transferred, the volume of information on gangs and gang members will increase rapidly. This surge of new information may give the impression that gangs across the state are growing at an enormous rate. Until this database is up to date and populated with all the known gangs and gang members, an estimation of the scope of gang activity in the state will be little more than an educated guess. While the full impact of NC GangNet is a year or two away, agencies already using the system recognize its value.
Implementing a Statewide Gang Information Data Base

Background

The denial of gang presence by many law enforcement and community leaders has been the dominant mindset in the United States. While law enforcement has increased their efforts to recognize and familiarize themselves with gangs and their criminal activity, many local governments continue to be in a state of denial. North Carolina, as well as other states and national organizations, has repeatedly experienced low survey response from agencies when asked about gang activity in their areas. Without this information it has been difficult to determine just how widespread gang activity is, and the lack of this type of knowledge can lead to an increase in gang presence, violent crime and officer safety issues.

The basis for any major initiative should be factual. North Carolina relied on the most recent data available in making its case for a statewide intelligence database. In 1999, the North Carolina Criminal Justice Analysis Center of the Governor’s Crime Commission released a report which examined the nature and extent of youth gangs across the state. At least 332 distinct gangs comprised of at least 5,068 members were identified (Yearwood & Hayes, 2000). In 2004 the Analysis Center replicated the 1999 study in an effort to ascertain how youth gangs have changed.

Fifty-six of 100 counties responded to the 2004 survey. There were 387 gangs identified with 8,517 members, showing an increase from 1999. This indicated that there was an increased awareness and acknowledgement of gang activity by law enforcement in many North Carolina jurisdictions.

In 2007, the National Youth Gang Center (NYGC) surveyed more than 2,500 law enforcement agencies across the United States. Ninety percent responded to the survey. Based on their study the NYGC
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estimated that approximately 760,000 gang members and 24,000 gangs were active in more than 2,900 jurisdictions (NYGC, 2007).

How the NC GangNet Initiative Began

In 2003, the Durham County Sheriff’s Office and the Durham Police Department submitted a proposal to the North Carolina Governor’s Crime Commission (GCC) for a county-wide gang intelligence database. Their proposal outlined in detail, the need for this type of system. The GCC gave a grant to the sheriff’s office to implement their system at a local level. Durham made numerous presentations regarding the success of their database to other jurisdictions and was inundated with requests to join their system since it was more cost effective than agencies implementing their own systems without outside funding. Durham began to allow other agencies to connect to their system for a fee to offset their costs of the added users.

Shortly thereafter, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD) approached GCC for similar funding. CMPD was granted funding and implemented their database system duplicating Durham’s. However, CMPD did not allow for outside users on their system. This lack of capability for adding new users created a problem for the areas surrounding Charlotte. Charlotte’s gang activity was spreading to other communities and to the western part of the state, but other agencies had no information on the identities of these gangs nor the serious nature of their previous crimes and activities. Also, information collected by CMPD was not shared with other agencies thus limiting the benefit to their project.

In response to the CMPD problem, several western law enforcement agencies submitted grant applications to the GCC to implement their own database systems. At the same time, Durham was unable to keep up with the requests for new users, plus their costs were increasing to meet
the new demands. GCC officials noted that having a regional database was beneficial to all member agencies, observing that the Durham system was more successful since it promoted a regional approach to combating gang activity and violence.

GCC staff created a task force to consider expanding Durham’s concept and asked members from the Durham and Charlotte teams to be a part of the task force as well. The costs of expansion would increase for both Durham and CMPD (especially since CMPD had to purchase new licensing and software to accommodate outside agencies). To offset the costs of equipment as well as personnel, it was determined that Durham and CMPD would have to charge outside agencies higher fees that smaller departments would not be able to afford. The costs associated with the expansion would likely kill the initiative before it started.

**The Solution**

The task force decided that the best course of action was to create a statewide database with no initial costs for all agencies that wanted to be part of the system. A steering committee would oversee the initiative, make recommendations, locate funding for the project, and decide how the project would be implemented. The steering committee included expert representatives from information and technology (IT), training and policies from Durham PD, Durham SO, CMPD, GCC staff, the N.C. Sheriffs’ Association, the N.C. Police Chiefs, the NC Department of Correction (prison and community services), the NC State Bureau of Investigation (IT and Investigators), and the NC Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.

The next step was choosing the type of database system. Durham, CMPD and all the member agencies reported that the current systems were user friendly and provided all the information law enforcement needed for investigative purposes. It would also be more cost effective to keep
the current systems in place then to start over. The parent company was contacted to determine if a statewide system could be established using the current nodes in Charlotte and Durham, and if all member agencies could access information from both nodes, and share the costs associated with the expansion.

The steering committee was assured that the statewide initiative was possible, and in fact was being used statewide in Florida and California. All information in the database could be viewed by any member if a third node was implemented. Costs associated with the three year project would total about 1.5 million dollars including IT personnel and associated costs to train new users.

The steering committee split into subcommittees to tackle three areas: policies and procedures, IT, and training.

The policy and procedures subcommittee established procedures for the use, maintenance and control of the state’s centralized criminal gang intelligence database system.

The IT subcommittee acts as liaison to the parent company, determines the ability for external agencies to input and retrieve information from their host server, and creates a seamless method for both eastern and western North Carolina agencies to search the centralized database. The IT committee is responsible for insuring that the system meets federal regulations for establishing a secure site.

The training subcommittee is responsible for creating training manuals, developing a system to insure all agencies are instructed on the use of the system, and emphasizing the importance of complying with the policies and procedures set by the steering committee, as well as consequences for failing to do so. This subcommittee also determines who provides training and the best methods of doing so.
The Benefits of a Statewide System

Officer safety is the most important benefit of the statewide system. Officers will have immediate access to a database that can provide life saving information at the time of the initial encounter with a suspected gang member. Officers will have information as to previous gang activity and the migration patterns of the suspect. Durham has reported several instances where victims or witnesses have provided only one piece of information, such as a tattoo, and the suspects were immediately identified when the information search was conducted. A homicide victim was identified using the system, decreasing notification time to the family as well as saving valuable investigation time.

Regional Information Sharing System or RISS Gang

The Regional Informational Sharing System (RISS) is a national program designed to help local, state, federal, and tribal criminal justice agencies identify, target, and eliminate criminal activities by sharing information among those agencies that pursue criminal conspiracies determined to be interjurisdictional in nature. RISS Gang is a service that historically has been provided to RISS member law enforcement agencies that enter gang member information into a national database. This system is lightly used by law enforcement agencies in North Carolina. The benefit of this system is that it frees local law enforcement agencies from entering data as with NC GangNet. RISS Gang asks that member agencies simply provide a paper copy of an incident report or other information gathered, and they will enter the data. As;

Our nation’s law enforcement agencies have seen a recent resurgence in gang-related crimes. RISS has utilized the RISS National Gang Database (RISSGang), a specialized database used to collect and disseminate information on criminal gangs and gang members, for many years. This database provides law enforcement agencies with easy
access to gang information, including suspects, organizations, weapons, locations, and vehicles, as well as visual imagery of gang members, gang symbols, and gang graffiti. Historically, this database has been limited to only RISS member agencies. However, in 2005, in an effort to increase the sharing of gang information, RISS expanded the availability of RISSGang information to nonmember criminal justice agencies as well. Through the technology and security of RISSNET, permissions can now be assigned to nonmember agency officers to access the critical data available in RISSGang. (RISS, 2005).

Advantages and Drawbacks of RISS Gang

RISS Gang allows for agencies to send in field notes that are entered into the national database by RISS employees at no charge. Its primary drawback is that there are fewer than ten agencies in North Carolina that use this database with very few gang members entered. Also, criteria for gang membership has to be a national criteria and because of its national coverage, 16 and 17 year olds would have limited information.

The current gang situation in the state’s prisons

Prison population data indicate that approximately 5.5 percent of the stock population on June 30, 2007 were known security threat group members. Data for the same period in 2004 indicate that 1.4 percent of the population had been identified as security threat group members; thus the percentage of known threat group members has increased each year since 2004 with a spike occurring between 2006, with 3.4 percent, to the current 5.5 percent. Additional data indicate that approximately two percent of the incoming new prisoners acknowledge gang membership at intake.
The North Carolina Department of Correction made a commitment in 1995 to address the issues of security threat groups (STG) or gangs within the prisons. Since the inception of the STG Program, the department has seen a significant increase in the number of STG members, coupled with a degree of pervasive violence. In recent years, the agency with the assistance of the Governor’s Crime Commission has devoted resources in developing two initiatives; Security Threat Group Management Unit (STGMU), as well as the Community Threat Group Program (CTG). In addition, the implementation and enforcement of a zero-tolerance policy for gang signs, symbols and activities has increased the emphasis for training correctional staff.

The responsibilities of staff begins with awareness, monitoring population trends and patterns, developing management, community and housing strategies, programming tracts and collaborative monitoring and information sharing with supervising authorities and law enforcement agencies. However, the most effective method to minimize security threat groups is having advanced knowledge of their activities. Intelligence gathering is the primary method to suppress and prevent threat group activity that is both criminal and disruptive to public safety and the safety of correctional institutions.

**Security Threat Group Management Unit Initiative – (STGMU)**

In order to address the increasing these concerns the Division of Prisons employed the security threat group management unit (STGMU) at Foothills Correctional Institution in Morganton, N.C., during 2005. The goal was to establish a structured program that provides the inmate with educational, social and cognitive skills, instills self-discipline and promotes respect for others by establishing goals and objectives for each inmate. The ultimate goal for inmates is to disassociate from security threat groups and reintegrate at designated facilities consistent with
custody classification. The program provides a non-punitive, close-custody assignment that provides sufficient supervision to ensure appropriate safety and security for both staff and inmates.

The specific purposes of the STG program are:

- To decrease threats to facility safety and security by STG members;
- To reduce assaults on staff and inmates;
- To eliminate/reduce the impact of STG on facility operations;
- To reduce the ability and potential of recruitment;
- To advance the ability to monitor and evaluate intelligence; and
- To allow inmates to be involved in a phase-structured program that allows participation in a series of programs that focus on cognitive behavioral changes and provide an opportunity for the inmate to renounce his STG affiliation and return to the general population.

PROGRAM COMPONENTS

The Security Threat Group Management Unit Program is a three-phase program that lasts nine months. Ideally, each phase is three months, but the specific time required to complete the program depends on the behavior and progress of each inmate. To complete the program, inmates must successfully participate in and complete substantive relevant programs and display satisfactory institutional behavior. Inmates may be promoted or demoted within the three phases of the program depending on their behavior and program performance. Any inmate who is removed from the program and placed on lockup, due to inappropriate behavior, will still be required to complete the program. The program is designed to give the inmate the insight and tools necessary to interact appropriately without the perceived need of
membership in a STG.

In Phase I inmates undergo an orientation to both the facility and the program. Staff representatives conduct psychological testing of the offenders to determine psychological symptoms, level of risk and areas of inmate intervention needs. The program offers anger management and stress management to offenders.

Phase II inmates participate in a fully developed cognitive behavioral course that helps them recognize the negative effects of gang-affiliated actions. The program presents a comprehensive introduction to cognitive restructuring, problem solving and social skills. In addition, offenders participate in a gang modular segment that encourages offenders to identify and discuss all of the negative consequences of gang involvement.

Phase III offenders participate in several different modules. Character education includes a variety of psycho-educational group modules addressing the individual needs and risk factors of each inmate as identified by assessment results. Relapse prevention is designed to help the inmate anticipate and handle challenges to their efforts to change, explore emotional, interpersonal and social factors that increase their risk for returning to criminal behavior; and to review strategies for anticipating and managing these factors. Commitment to change helps motivate and facilitate change by explaining the personal cost of a destructive lifestyle and demonstrating specifically how change can begin.

In addition, Phase III offers the father accountability program. The program recognizes that the absence of a father in a child’s life is a major factor in the continuing cycle of crime and violence and therefore targets those offenders with children. The program is structured to provide

fathers with experiences that allow the new cognitive (thinking) and effective (feeling) responses, thus providing the opportunity to change parenting attitudes and behaviors. Other program elements of Phase III include teaching inmates with limited vocational experience basic employment skills and identifying and discussing challenges facing offenders in the job market. Offenders also undergo additional psychological testing during Phase III.

PROGRAM CAPACITY

The Security Threat Group Management Unit consists of 192 beds of which 128 are designated specifically for the program while the remaining 64 are used for inmates in the program who require housing separate from the STG inmates due to behavior or medical issues. The 64 segregation beds include disciplinary and administrative segregation, protective custody, intensive control and medical and mental health assignments.

The following information provides an overview of the STGMU operation since inception. Between July 2005 and June 2007, 267 inmates were referred to the STGMU and transferred to Foothills Correctional Institution.

- 32 inmates (12 percent) were subsequently removed from the STGMU for disciplinary reasons (e.g., high security control and maximum control)
- 107 inmates (41 percent) graduated from the STGMU
- 119 (46 percent) inmates are currently assigned to the STGMU

Program evaluation data indicate that this program has been successful in reducing inmate infractions both during treatment and after program completion. Data on 67 program participants reveal a 32 percent
reduction in infractions while the inmates were in the program, compared
to six months prior to enrollment. Furthermore, this behavioral change
persisted after graduation. Follow-up data on the graduates seven
months later indicate 83 percent fewer gang related infractions, 78
percent fewer class A infractions, 23 percent fewer Class B infractions
and a 71 percent reduction in Class C infractions. Across all infraction
types program graduates demonstrated 68 percent fewer infractions
compared to their behavior six months prior to enrollment in the program
(North Carolina Department of Correction, 2007).

Recognizing an increase in gang activity and membership among
parolees and probationers, the Division of Community Corrections
convened a gang task force in September 2004. This task force, which
was comprised of probation officers, Division of Prisons’ staff and local
law enforcement officials, developed supervision standards and
strategies for managing gang offenders who are under the custody of
community corrections. Intermediate probation officers in each of the
state’s 100 counties have formed partnerships with local law
enforcement, court personnel, prison intelligence officers and other local
agencies to target gang members and curtail gang activity and
involvement among probationers, parolees and other offenders on post-
release status.

As part of this Community Threat Group Program, gang affiliated
offenders must meet all of the normal conditions of probation/parole, as
well as gang specific stipulations including: no contact with other gang
members, they can not wear gang related clothes, jewelry and other gang
paraphernalia, they must participate in Project Safe Neighborhood
notification call-ins where applicable and they must avoid court
appearances unless the offender is a victim/witness or defendant.

Program rollout was completed on a statewide basis in March 2006.
Data indicate that 414 staff members were trained during three
implementation phases. From August 1st, 2005 through June 30th,
2006 a total of 420 offenders were reviewed/subjected to a documentation or validation process, to assess their gang status, with 231 being validated as active gang members, 175 being documented as watch status and 91 offenders actually being placed in the program (North Carolina Department of Correction, 2007b).

**How the Department of Public Instruction addressed the gang issue**

The Department of Public Instruction’s School Safety and Climate Section has provided gang prevention awareness activities to local education agency safe and drug free school staff, external partners and 21st century community learning center afterschool programs over the years. Each of the activities stressed the impact gang involvement has on the overall well-being of North Carolina’s students and how these gang-related associations influence academic performance. 

The School Safety and Climate Section offered the following activities to various audiences across the state. It is understood that risk factors are precursors to gang involvement, thus several of the sessions address topics related to gang prevention. The topics included the following:

- Workshops on the impact gangs have on afterschool programming presented to directors of the 21st Century Community Learning Centers, which represented over 99 grantees, 300 centers and more than 23,000 students.

- Sessions to Safe and Drug Free Schools Coordinators, 21st CCLC Directors, Character Education Coordinators and Dropout Prevention Coordinators on “Developing a Community-Based Gang Prevention Coalition” presented by Wake County Schools Representatives. This audience consisted of more than 200 participants.

- Supported the train-the-trainer model by sending consultants to
regional Gang Prevention Workshops and trainings.

- Gang Prevention awareness sessions presented to administrators and staff at the 2007 Alternative Learning Program Fall Institute.

- A strand on Gang Prevention offered during the 2005, 06 and 07 Safe Schools and Character Education Conferences, which represents approximately 1,000 attendees each year from law enforcement, universities, Local Education Agencies, schools, communities and faith-based organizations and parent groups.

- Sessions on the impact Latino/Hispanic street gangs have on schools and communities to Safe and Drug Free Schools Coordinators.

- Bullying Prevention training provided to counselors, law enforcement, social workers, community-based representatives and school-based personnel. Two-day training session on bully prevention in the context of creating positive school climates presented in collaboration with the National School Safety Office.

**Gang prevention initiatives implemented by the Department of Justice**

The North Carolina Justice Academy conducted eight youth gang awareness courses during fiscal year 2006-2007 at both the Salemburg and Edneyville campuses. A total of 134 participants from 63 different law enforcement agencies attended these training sessions with representatives from police departments, campus security and sheriffs’ offices. Staff also coordinated the North Carolina Gang Investigators Association’s Conference in fall of 2006 for nearly 350 participants.

**What the literature reveals about gang programs and effective practices**

Unfortunately, there is no one definitive and comprehensive guide or meta-analysis on effective practices or evidence based programming, for
addressing the issue of gangs, such as found in the work of the Cochran or Campbell Collaboratives. As the recent Justice Policy Institute gang study authors Greene and Pranis (2007) note: “Although there is no clear solution for preventing youth from joining gangs and participating in gang sanctioned violence, there are evidence-based practices that work with at-risk and delinquent youth, the same youth who often join gangs. Whether these programs work with gang members depends more on the individual youth than on whether he or she belongs to a gang”.

The following is a synthesis of the existing gang literature derived from voluminous research studies which have been conducted since the 1920s, gang experts, and smaller independent program evaluations.

How Law Enforcement and Communities Must Work Together

Making communities a safe place to live is easier said than done. A law enforcement officer commented (Venkatesh, 2006):

Most people I work with think you can just lock [gang members] up, put them away for life. Like that’s really going to do anything when you have five hundred more of these people waiting right behind them...The most important persons you will find are in the church, they’re working with kids, and they are in the block clubs, barbershops. That hasn’t changed. And I’m glad they are working problems out by themselves. We help when we can, but the community is really in the lead.

Law enforcement provides an invaluable service to communities. However, if the community does not work with local officers, then they will be continually at odds and unable to agree on how to solve problems, possibly even working against one another. Concerning programs that would use this ability of the community to lead the way for change, as well as the abilities of law enforcement, a team of researchers led by Irving Spergel said (1994):

There is no clear solution for preventing youths from being curious about joining and participating in gang activities. This does not imply that gang prevention and intervention are a waste of time and resources. The social expense of developing new and innovative gang prevention programs, based on practices that have shown some success, is far less than the loss of one life saved or the cost of incarceration.
“The police department should adopt an approach that combines suppression of youth gang criminal acts through aggressive enforcement of laws, with community mobilization involving a broad cross-section of the community in combating the problem.”

Even improvements to the community in general are theorized to have reductions on delinquent acts. This includes theories relative to crime prevention through environmental design in which Wheeler and Cottrell (1966) note, “we may be able to prevent some delinquency, not by acting directly upon the delinquent with casework or other services, but by acting on his social and physical environment.” However, this does not mean improvements in the community can be made at the whims of city officials. Ideally it would involve interacting with youth and other residents directly in order to determine their needs and make the most helpful changes. Fleisher (1998) determined that “communities must achieve a balance between law enforcement and service delivery, preferably before arrests occur.”

The Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project targeted youth and young adults to reduce gang violence in certain areas of Chicago (See Appendix 1,A). Weed & Seed is a nationally implemented program that seeks to reduce crime and increase community activity in order to sustain the reduced crime rate (See Appendix 1,B). Both of these programs rely on collaboration between law enforcement and community leaders.

**Identified Effective Practices**

Collaborative approaches to the gang problem are generally agreed to be the best strategy. However, given the demands that such collaboration puts on a wide variety of groups, proper implementation can be difficult.

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6. The Governor’s Crime Commission and the Analysis Center would like to acknowledge Marguerite Peebles, Safe Schools Chief at the Department of Public Instruction, for compiling the data in this section.
Based on these studies of how law enforcement and communities can (and can not) work together, the following factors may lead to successful program development:

- Programs involving the use of law enforcement officers, individually or as part of a specially developed unit, must have continuous administrative support. Lack of this support can diminish performance and offset potential progress.

- Street-level contacts provide valuable insight into gang members' lives and can help determine appropriate program development.

- A pre-existing community infrastructure gives investment value to the area that can heighten community involvement and funding by other groups as well as allow for specific program goals to emphasize strengths of the area.

- Focusing on a small geographic area allows funding to be concentrated. In addition, a small area generally contains people of the same socio-economic status, allowing for programs to appeal to all of the target population.

- Creation of culturally relevant programs will increase community involvement.

- Simultaneous operation of police and community efforts allow for crime to be reduced while avoiding gaps where the criminals are gone but the community is still suffering residual effects.

- Over-emphasis of police activity in comprehensive programs can cause residential dispute over what the neighborhood is gaining, while too much focus on the community operations

7. The authors are indebted to Mark Strickland and Peggy Schaefer of the N.C. Justice Academy for providing this training data.
may fail to deter the more serious criminals.

- Planning must be flexible to adapt to the changing needs of the community and effectively target displaced criminal activity. This would likely require regular performance reviews to alter or eliminate any parts that are not making progress.

- While allowing for flexibility, a program must strive to follow its planned research goals to ensure that the hypothesis and results can be accurately measured.

**How Curfew and Truancy Laws Affect Gangs**

Curfew and truancy laws fit well with preventing gang activity. Since most gang members are juveniles, keeping them off the streets at night and in school during the day greatly limits the opportunity for them to engage in most gang-related activity. Curfew laws have become common in urban American cities as another law enforcement tool to reduce criminal activity. High truancy rates in the school system have been identified as an early warning sign of juvenile delinquency, including problems such as substance abuse, violent activity, and incarceration (Baker et al., 2001). Even behavior in pre-teen years such as stubbornness and disobedience can be risk factors of truancy and other, more violent delinquency acts (OJJDP, 1998).

The anti-gang initiatives were programs that sought to combine police patrols with curfew and truancy enforcement to suppress gang-related activity (see Appendix 1. C). Operation Night Light involved frequent street contacts with high-risk juveniles during evening hours (see Appendix 1. D). The Abolish Chronic Truancy (ACT) Now program successfully linked lawyers, schools, and communities together to increase awareness of truancy and provide a coordinated effort to reduce the problem (see Appendix 1. E). Also, the Truancy Reduction Demonstration Program (TDRP) has been an important part of various
Weed & Seed strategies in many different states (see Appendix 1. F).

**Curfew**

LeBoeuf (1996) finds that curfew ordinances and community-based curfew initiatives receive positive responses from residents, and can be combined with recreational activity to give youth an alternative to delinquent activity. However, Adams (2003) finds that, in an analysis of 10 separate studies, curfews do not reduce either crime or criminal victimization. Males and Macallair (1999) also conclude that curfew enforcement did not affect crime and is too simplistic a solution to deter youth crime, at least on its own.

Looking at crime statistics, curfew still holds potential to be effective in reducing juvenile delinquency and victimization if implemented with the right combination of activities. Statistics from Dallas, Texas reveal that most murders and aggravated assaults by juveniles are between 10:00pm and 1:00am. Also, rape is most common between 1:00am and 3:00am. Many times these crimes all happen on public streets and highways (Leboeuf, 1996).

Thus, despite research denying the effectiveness of curfew, crime data reveals a significant risk of becoming involved in delinquency during after-curfew hours. Curfew must be part of a more comprehensive approach if they are to help reduce crime and gang activity. Also if a curfew is to be used, then law enforcement officers must recognize it as a valuable part of their strategy. One program that successfully engaged officers in enforcing evening and after-hours curfew violations as part of their probation was Operation Night Light (Refer to the Appendix).

**Identified Effective Practices**

Neither patrols nor curfew laws alone can effectively reduce gang activity.
Similarly, truancy reporting, while providing valuable information, does not prevent crime. However, proper coordination of the parts may provide a more valuable whole. The following factors address what may prove successful based on results of these studies:

- Include additional law enforcement patrol units for such programs to specifically target teens suspicious of curfew or truancy violations. Simply adding more patrols with a blanket requirement to enforce curfew may lead to a lack of concern by law enforcement due to their other duties. This may work best through community policing and departmental incentives.

- Using a curfew law on its own, or changing existing curfew times, will not impact juvenile delinquency. These laws must be incorporated into a larger group, be it law enforcement, probation, or community leaders, who will properly enforce curfew. Laws on the books must be put into practice.

- Curfew enforcement must consist of more than phone calls and daytime meetings. A physical presence of an officer at the scheduled curfew time will emphasize the seriousness of the program and help build rapport with the youth and family.

- Truancy programs must be developed in cooperation with the school systems. This allows for more accurate reporting of the problem by school officials, a strengthened relationship between schools and police, and increased data available to both.

- Curfew and truancy problems are not without parental responsibility. Community support of such programs should include not only their support, but their involvement as well. Addressing any youth problems to the parents may be more effective than telling the youth alone.
Reducing Gun Violence and Drive-by Shootings

According to official statistics from the U.S. Department of Justice, violent crime rates and homicide rates are continuing to decline each year. Yet as gangs remain in an area for a prolonged period of time, it is likely that they will become more involved in the use of firearms – a trend that coincides with gang-related homicide (Howell, Egley Jr., Gleason, 2002). Many times juveniles obtain guns with the belief that having a firearm will help them survive. A survey by Sheley & Wright (1993) found that more than 80 percent of incarcerated juveniles had been threatened with or shot at with a gun; mostly for territorial reasons or material gain. While not all of these juveniles may belong to gangs, the gang presence still creates a violent atmosphere which can influence their actions and perceptions towards guns. Gang members are roughly twice as likely to own guns, as well as carry them outside of their homes (Bjerregaard & Lizotte, 1995).

The Youth Firearms Violence Initiative is a federal initiative to deter people from carrying guns in hotspot areas for crime – this is generally carried out through the local community oriented policing services (see Appendix 1.G). The PACT project has been recently used in Atlanta to prevent juvenile gun violence through intervention (see Appendix 1.H). The Partnership for the Prevention of Juvenile Gun Violence is a comprehensive federal program to suppress gun-related crime, while reducing risk factors for such crime through community intervention (see Appendix 1.I). The Boston Gun Project focused on areas of Boston that had serious problems with youth violence, most of it gang-related (see Appendix 1.J). Operation Cul-de-Sac specifically targeted drive-by shooting through a unique approach to crime prevention (see Appendix 1.K).
Identified Effective Practices

The diversity of the above programs has given several promising strategies for reducing gun-related violence:

- Local development of program goals and the willingness to alter the program as necessary are much more effective than strictly following a federal plan that cannot fit all situations.

- Gang Suppression Units are most effective if the officers are freed from regular service calls. This helps the officers by allowing a more single-minded focus on the program in question, and helps the department by reducing the delays and interference that may result from carrying dual responsibility.

- Any program specific unit that is developed within law enforcement must take into consideration potential disputes from officers. Specially developed units should carry incentives for involvement, yet there should also be opportunities made for those not involved.

- In various youth firearm violence initiatives the use of search warrants proved the most effective tactic for gun seizure, while city-wide enforcement was most effective for making arrests.

- Using pre-existing organizations for prevention/intervention programs (e.g. Boy Scouts) may reduce the feeling of youth being singled out for special programs, and increase the feeling of being a regular part of the group. Any negative labels must be avoided.

- In planning multi-agency support, consensus about the gang problem must include a committed involvement in gang abatement programs. Relying on another’s help simply
because they agreed to there being a problem is not a practical solution.

- If a strategy is going to include strict sentencing sanctions, then making such punishment known to offenders (including public examples of some gang members through distribution of flyers or other means) can increase the deterrent effect.

- As seen in the Boston Gun Project, revealing to specific gang members how much information is known about them can potentially create a deterrent effect since they know they are being watched.

- Future use of Operation Cul-de-Sac will give more credibility to the effectiveness of traffic barriers to deter drive-by shootings.

Using Heavy Suppression Tactics

Suppression methods are the primary means of getting criminals off the street. These efforts are very important in many programs, and for some are the critical first phase of an operation. Depending on leadership structures and the degree of organization for different gangs, incarceration of gang leaders and probation for others can dismantle the gang as a whole. The problem arises in that suppression-only programming does not so much fix the problem as displaces it from streets into jails and detention centers.

Therefore, any program that is going to rely mostly on suppression – be it arrests, incarceration, or something else – must consider alternatives to these sanctions if it plans to end crime and gang activity in individuals or groups. The better organized a gang is, the more likely it is to resist efforts to suppress it.

The following two programs did not have such alternatives and sought to deter gang activity through suppression alone. Operation Hammer did
this by making a sweep of arrests (see Appendix 1.L). Operation Hardcore used intensive vertical prosecution (see Appendix 1.M).

**Identified Effective Practices**

- Suppressive tactics by law enforcement are a critical phase for high-crime areas. This type of gang control can get the worst offenders out of the picture to allow for other types of programs to be successful.

- Suppression alone rarely solves the gang problem. Many times the incarceration of gang members serves only to displace their activity into prison or detention centers.

- City-wide sweeps for the purpose of high arrests are extremely inefficient and ineffective as a deterrent.

- Programs that offer intensive prosecution and incarceration need to be coupled with alternative intervention programs for select youth. Otherwise, those individuals’ affiliation with gangs and crime is not so much solved as it is displaced onto others.

**Sentencing Practices and Gangs in Prison**

Gang control programs often rely on a certain degree of community activism in order to be successful. This becomes a problem when dealing with offenders who may spend just as much time in jails and detention centers as they do in the community. The juvenile court was originally established as such to lessen the stigma associated with being labeled a criminal for teenagers; ideally finding alternatives to incarceration. However, with the rising numbers of youth having to appear in juvenile court, as well as increasing populations in jails and prisons, even these detention centers have lost much of their rehabilitative goals. The
Supreme Court decided that, with regard to these juvenile facilities,

There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children (Wheeler & Cottrell, 1966).

While efforts have been made since then to improve the services offered to youth, there is still too much demand on many juvenile courts and probation officers to adequately address each youth’s needs. This can cause the youth to cycle in and out of detention centers, eventually ending up in prison.

Gang membership is certainly no secret for correctional facilities. Research shows that approximately 16 percent of jail inmates and 13 percent of prison inmates are gang members of some sort (Ruddell, Decker, Egley Jr., 2006). Combining this with the nearly 1,450,000 prison inmates, and 750,000 people in jail (BJA, 2007), there exists a great need for community programs to target those juveniles who are repeat offenders and those recently released from detention centers where they may have experienced heightened gang influence. Such programs cannot be limited to juveniles. Some offenders who enter detention facilities as youth may “age out” of the juvenile programming at release, thus being adults yet not having any connections outside of their former gang. Gangs can be seen as a pseudo-reintegration group back into society; therefore programs must show the greater value of avoiding criminal activity and gang influence. Approximately 40 percent of juveniles act in pairs or groups when committing crimes (McCord & Conway, 2005). As Fleisher (1998) observes,

When a kid perceives a gain by doing one thing instead of another, they move in the direction of the gain. When there’s a greater gain in selling drugs than in doing school work, drug
selling wins...When there’s a greater gain in hanging out with a gang than in avoiding it, the gang wins.

Much of the return to gangs comes from lack of opportunity elsewhere due to an ex-convict having insufficient resources upon release. Petersilia (2003) reports that only 60 percent of U.S. inmates have a high school diploma or GED; compared with 85 percent of the U.S. adult population. Also, much of the additional funding for prisons goes to construction and staffing costs rather than rehabilitative programs. Combining this with the fact that many employers were unwilling to hire applicants with a criminal record, it was found that almost one third of all released prisoners were rearrested within six months and two-thirds were rearrested within three years. Other problems that affect the re-entry of criminals into society include: housing, with many released prisoners unable to secure the funding for private housing. Further complicating this challenge is the practice of many states to deny welfare benefits in part or in whole to those convicted of certain felonies.

The following programs address some of these needs to target repeat offenders and offering alternative sentencing. The JUDGE program is a prosecutorial program targeting criminal youth and some adult gang members (see Appendix 1.N). The TARGET program is a multi-agency program to selectively incarcerate repeat offenders (see Appendix 1.O). Lifeskills’95 is a parole re-entry course given to juveniles immediately after release (see Appendix 1.P). Community justice boards are citizen-headed organizations that act on court order to dialogue with and decide on certain non-violent offenders’ sentence within the community (see Appendix 1.Q).

Identified Effective Practices

In 2002, only 12 percent of all released state prisoners received pre-release programs (Petersilia, 2003). The ways in which prisons and
recidivism feed into gang membership may be lessened by addressing the following:

- Prisons must provide more services, or better promote current services, to increase the training that prisoners receive while incarcerated. This training can be vital to their success upon release.
- Two of the most important services upon release from prison that can be provided are employment and housing.
- A reliable means of identifying juveniles who may become repeat offenders or “career criminals” is necessary not only for sentencing purposes, but also to assist with getting these youth involved in helpful programs at an early age.
- Repeat offenders should be prioritized in deterrent efforts in order to lessen their recurring impact on overall criminal activity.
- Targeting juvenile repeat offenders or similar at-risk youth should not be limited to suppression tactics. Get these youth involved in an early and sustained intervention program to give them a more positive outlook and provide encouragement to others.
- Individual counseling is very important for offender re-entry. This can help give juveniles understanding and trust in pursuing a better lifestyle.
- Counseling efforts may also prove beneficial if extended to those soon to be released from prison. This could aid in transition efforts for juveniles and adults.
- Selecting community justice boards to determine sanctions from an intervention standpoint may help reduce gang-related activity. This can be done by showing community support for
the youth to succeed from local residents, as well as reduce the stigma associated with going to jail.

**Programs for Teens and Schools**

There is a general assumption that adolescents have a need to form groups. This can be for various social, emotional or economic reasons. However sometimes these groups conflict with societal values, and it is no secret that teenage years proliferate the most gang activity for individuals. Schools are one of the best opportunities for gang recruitment, thus also making them one of the best opportunities for gang prevention and intervention.

Schools provide a number of programs that propose to be proactive in helping children, but the effectiveness of these programs is not always known, nor is it always a serious concern for the school. In fact, a survey of middle school educators showed that less than 10 percent felt that drug use was a big problem, and no more than 15 percent felt that bullying, violence or gang activity was a big problem for their school (Peterson & Esbensen, 2004). As with communities, schools too must first admit to the existence of a gang problem before they can fully support programs that address it.

One thing that communities must avoid is an over-emphasis on education that may overlook the poor families. As Wheeler (1966) writes, “communities with a heavy emphasis on education for the college-bound population may be lacking in services for poor families despite the high average socioeconomic level.” The problem is then created of encouraging and rewarding a certain goal without providing adequate means to achieve that goal. This creates undue stress on youth which may lead to delinquent activity.

Boys & Girls Clubs throughout the country seek to provide safe, caring environments for troubled youth (see Appendix 1.R). GREAT educates
middle-school youth about gangs and gang involvement (see Appendix 1.S). The TNT program is a prevention and intervention program that involves teen leadership (see Appendix 1.T). Various “alternative schools” provide other avenues of education for middle school and high school; often helping students to be successful who are performing poorly under the traditional model (see Appendix 1.U).

**Identified Effective Practices**

Middle school and high school directly coincide with the ages that are revealed as most likely for gang involvement. The following factors should be considered in the development of gang prevention and intervention programs relevant to this area:

- After school programs and community recreational centers provide a valuable opportunity for youth to be involved in such a way that avoids the dangers of the street. These programs can attract and retain at-risk youth and should not shut out youth who are involved in gangs.

- Any activity-oriented program for youth should take care to make sure that it is preventing gang behavior and gang association within the program – that is, that teens are not using the program area as a gang hang-out.

- Broad educational programming will not significantly impact gang activity. Educating youth about the dangers of gangs should be part of a broader program that can specifically target at-risk youth and supplement the teaching with counseling or other activity.

- Specific examples of gang members through biographical books can serve a dual purpose of educating and deterring
gang activity due to the oftentimes undesirable end that these gang members meet.

- Teaching at-risk youth proper leadership skills can allow them to spread effective anti-gang messages to their peers; either through formal presentations or informal every day conversation.

- Youth who show precursors to delinquency in their school system (bullying, truancy, poor performance, etc.) should be evaluated in order to find appropriate alternatives that allow them to continue their education and avoid a future of gang-related activity.

- When alternative schools are not an option, specialized programs within schools may be easier to implement. If properly conducted, these programs will have much more positive outcomes than simply forcing students to sit in detention after school or similar strategies.

**OJJDP Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression** *(Used by NC Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 2005)*

**Overview of Spergel Model**

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention’s comprehensive community-wide approach to gang prevention, intervention and suppression (commonly known as the Spergel Model) is one of the most recent and most rigorous program strategies currently being tested. All major comprehensive gang programs used before “pale in the face of what has become known as the Spergel Model” (Klein & Maxson, 2006).

Five program sites were funded between 1995 and 2000, each being
planned around the Spergel Model’s five core components (Spergel, Curry, Chance, Kane, Ross, Alexander, Simmons, Oh, 1994):

- Community mobilization
- Social intervention
- Provision of social and economic opportunities
- Gang suppression
- Organized change and development of the above components through specialized teams or task forces.

The Spergel Model emphasizes collaboration. Programs of all sorts, be they family and school programs to prevent gang involvement, community opportunities and incarceration alternatives to intervene in gang members’ lives, or law enforcement units to remove criminals from the streets, must all come together for success. This makes the Spergel Model a guideline for the creation, implementation and communication of, and between, many smaller programs from many different groups.

The program elements involved in the implementation of the Spergel Model at each of the five reviewed sites (Spergel, Wa, Sosa, 2001; 2002; 2003b; 2004a; 2004b) are as follows:

- Steering Committee – community leadership through the mayor’s office, city council and other administrative heads.
- Lead-Agency Management – one particular agency, such as a police department, ensures coordination of all program elements and mobilization of resources.
- Interagency Outreach Street Team – police, probation officers, youth workers and others to assess the needs of residents and gang members.
- Grassroots Involvement – Churches, block clubs, other less formal groups interact with established agencies in providing
services to those in need.

• Social Services – provides services to needy youth and families based on contacts with the street team.

• Criminal Justice Participation – sharing information across criminal justice agencies assists in the daily activities of each respective agency relative to gang problems.

• School Participation – involvement of area school systems with the steering committee to help assess and serve at-risk youth.

• Employment & Training – arrangements between schools, businesses and the street team provide jobs and educational opportunities for youth.

One underlying factor that caused problems in each of the five program sites was the lack of a well-articulated guide for how to implement the Spergel Model consistently. At the outset of these programs, they had the goals of the model and a general guideline as to what each involved agency should be doing. A lack of detail in this guide caused great variation across the program sites not only in the youth that were targeted, but also in the strength of various inter-agency relations.

A brief look at these five program sites, followed by further explanation of the benefits and drawbacks of the Spergel Model, will provide some insight into the difficulties involved in establishing a comprehensive community-wide program; as well as inconsistencies that result from the lack of a well-defined and matured program model (see Appendix 1. V through Z).

Benefits and Drawbacks of the Spergel Model

Benefits from using the Spergel Model are clear; this comprehensive approach can bring a whole city together in a focused effort to eliminate gang activity. Also, the model’s structure allows research to be
conducted on the effectiveness of individual programs as well as assessing the overall model. That is, if the community has the resources and relationships necessary to fully implement the model. Given the clarification of the Spergel Model that has been produced over the last few years, smaller communities could still benefit from partial implementation if planned correctly.

Perhaps the largest hindrance to the success of the Spergel Model in the reviewed program sites was the inability of all the groups included as program elements to coordinate and continue their involvement. While this was due in part to the resources that each community had available, it was also the result of officially starting the Spergel Model’s testing period without providing accurate and articulated instructions of how to implement all of the components. In fact, a clearly articulated summary of this plan was not available until the latter half of the 1995-2000 program-period – much too late to have a significant effect (Klein & Maxson, 2006). For the most part, these program sites were working off of an ad-hoc guide that said to include all of the above components, yet did not give the resources necessary to keep each site consistent with the others in its implementation.

This obscure guidance resulted in a wide variety of applications – some of which strayed from the original intent. Klein and Maxson (2006) list five challenges with the Spergel Model based on preliminary results:

- An adequate write-up of the model and how to implement it was unavailable.
- The OJJDP settled for lesser results with regard to the reports from the last two program sites.
- The complexities of this comprehensive approach may have been beyond the capacities of many jurisdictions.
- To be successful, an on-site coordinator must provide constant monitoring and feedback. This was not available for all sites.
• An unclearly articulated and shifting model prevented testing the program’s genuine rationale.

Other problems that were revealed included an unclear definition of who qualified as at-risk youth, and difficulty in making a shift from intervention programs for older youth to prevention programs for younger youth (2006).

No matter what the general drawbacks and previous program problems were, any absolute statements on the ability of the Spergel Model to succeed must be withheld until it can be consistently implemented according to plan.

**Recommendations for Future Use of the Spergel Model**

Any future use of the OJJDP Comprehensive Model either in part or in whole should first begin with a reading of the Implementation Guide available from the OJJDP (2002). This guide has been developed to clarify the goals of each committee within the Model, provide the questions which should be asked in order to accurately target the problem, and provide direction on several other key elements including additional literature to review.

The major challenge faced with future use of the Spergel Model is implementation in its entirety. While not possible in many scenarios due to limited resources, it must be replicated in this manner in order to verify its effectiveness as a whole. Even so, many communities could benefit from partial use of the Spergel Model based on a review of the Implementation Guide and development of projects that focus on two or more of the five core components. This partial approach can benefit committees in three ways: understanding the model as a whole, identifying which components would be the most applicable to their area, and maintaining a degree of comprehensiveness, albeit smaller, by focusing on two or more components instead of all five.

It may be possible for separate past programs to be redeveloped as parts
of the Spergel Model. This could provide the benefit of using a more narrowly focused program, while having the Spergel Model to guide that program’s involvement in a more comprehensive atmosphere. While each of the five project sites have their individual lessons to be learned, Klein and Maxson (2006) emphasize the view that “long-term successful gang control will not be achieved by intervention with youth, but by intervention with the nature of gang-spawning communities.” Here again we see support for the idea that no matter how much you target the youth, the greater and more important target is the community in which these youth, and their gangs, reside.

**Concluding Remarks**

Past programs have failed for a number of reasons: poorly conceived or poorly implemented, lack of cooperation between agencies, insufficient resources and funding, or various political disputes that lessen support. No matter how effective any program is at individual rehabilitation, these efforts will be wasted if this transformed person is placed back within an environment of crime and gang activity. That is, even the most promising program graduate will falter when overwhelmed by old peers and the social factors that lead to delinquency in the first place. Since street gangs operate within communities, it is absolutely essential for the community to change if there is to be a change in local gang activity. Many times this requires a prolonged, concentrated effort to improve the neighborhood and provide opportunities outside of joining the gang.

While the community carries the greatest influence, the role of law enforcement must also be upheld. No matter how much emphasis is placed on the role of the community as a whole, these citizens should not make efforts to compromise with gangs or punish gang members themselves. Local police can do a far better job of removing the most violent offenders, some of whom may serve as an example for lesser
Thus, removal of certain criminals from a community is necessary, but meaningless if the community has not changed to the point where youth can look elsewhere to more positive role models. A role model should be someone who is a community leader and activist, not someone who is destined for prison.

Within the workings of this criminal justice system, the gang displacement that suppressive tactics cause must be kept in mind. The prison system holds many gang members and breeds new ones. This gang activity, though supposedly contained, must be monitored just as closely as gangs on the outside. Some of the more organized gangs can continue to operate and be influenced to varying degrees by members who are incarcerated. Also, known gang members in prisons or detention centers are the most likely group of people to become re-involved with a gang. Unless intervention efforts are made throughout a gang member’s stay in prison and following immediately upon release, that gang member will revert to his or her former lifestyle that is known, rather than learn and be encouraged in pursuing other opportunities.

Wherever the gang problem arises, it must be targeted as soon as possible. The longer a gang exists in any given area, the more likely its members are to become more violent and more organized. There must be a clear, consistent definition of gangs for the various groups and agencies that work with gang members. Agencies must cooperate consistently and share information, program results must be closely and continuously monitored to account for their effectiveness, and as many people as possible, from as many different groups as possible, must lend their support to solve the gang problem and prevent it from reoccurring. Such a solution to the removal of gangs and reformation of gang members is far from simple; any answer will have to be pursued over years of concentrated and ambitious efforts.
How gangs and gang activity will change by the year 2012

The paucity of available and reliable gang data makes projections extremely difficult and the following information should not be used as the sole factor when allocating funds or determining how serious a community’s gang situation will be five years from now. The following data are best guess estimates as future trends do not always mimic current trends and the implementation of effective gang programs may curtail and reduce gang involvement on the part of North Carolina’s teens and young adults.

Data from the Commission’s prior 1999 and 2004 research studies, as well as data from the current survey, were utilized to produce estimates of future gang involvement and to extrapolate a statewide projection for 2012. The number of gang members, within each of the counties for which data was available, was divided by the county’s 15 to 24 year old male population, which is typically the average age range for both gang members and for peak criminal involvement, in order to gain an estimate of what percentage of each county’s 15 to 24 year old male population is involved in gang activities.

The average percent of gang membership was calculated for each responding county, and for each of the three survey years to produce three sample averages. The average annual growth rate from 1999 to 2007 was calculated \((4.0\% - 1.3\% / 8 = .34\) and projected forward to 2012 producing an estimated rate of 5.7 percent. This rate was then multiplied by the projected 2012 15 to 24 year old male population in order to provide an estimate of future gang membership for the entire state \((5.7\% \times 725,661\) Based on this limited linear projection there could be 41,363 gang members in North Carolina in 2012 (Refer to Table 2). Operating under a more conservative model with the assumption of zero growth, from now until 2012, in the number of gang members as a
percentage of the 15-24 year old male population produces an estimate of 29,026 gang members (4% x 725,661).

Ascertaining where gangs will be geographically is also problematic as shifting demographics, the economy, the lack of available gang programs as well as a host of other factors can all interact to produce a shift in the rise and fall of gangs and gang activity. As a general rule, and assuming no effective prevention, intervention and suppression tactics are applied, gangs will remain more prevalent in the state’s larger cities and could become an institutionalized and intergenerational phenomenon. Mid-sized towns and cities could see a slight increase in the number of gangs and gang members with the state’s smaller towns beginning to see marginal gang activity by 2012.

**Table 2  Projected Statewide Gang Membership for 2012**

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<tr>
<td><strong>A. Number of</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>reported gang</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>members in sample</strong></td>
<td>5,068</td>
<td>8,517</td>
<td>14,593</td>
<td>XXX</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>B. Number of</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>counties providing a</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>count of gang</strong></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>XXX</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>members</strong></td>
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<td><strong>C. Average percent</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>of county gang</strong></td>
<td>1.3 %</td>
<td>1.6 %</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
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<td><strong>members / county</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>15-24 year old male</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>population</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>D. Statewide 15-24</strong></td>
<td>576,652</td>
<td>633,190</td>
<td>680,360</td>
<td>725,661</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>year old male</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>population</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>E. Estimated</strong></td>
<td>7,496</td>
<td>10,131</td>
<td>27,214</td>
<td>41,363</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>statewide gang</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>population</strong></td>
<td>(C x D)</td>
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The effect that increasing penalties for gang membership and gang activities has on gangs and gang related behavior

Proponents of stiffer and enhanced penalties for gang members and gang related crimes argue that these tactics remove the hard core gang bangers from the community and also improve the likelihood of obtaining more plea bargains. Opponents argue that focusing on only the most hardcore gangs and gang members can backfire and actually increase gang notoriety, their street reputation and intensify gang cohesiveness and solidarity. Taken to the extreme, significantly punitive measures can create community polarization along racial and ethnic lines as members of minority communities may feel that they are being unfairly associated with all gang crime and are being stereotyped or profiled as either gang members or pro-gang when in fact they are not (Umemoto, 2006).

An older, yet still informative, national survey of prosecutors found that only 14 states had enacted gang-specific legislation with only a small number of prosecutors using these statutes on a regular basis. Of those not using the comprehensive gang statutes the most commonly reported reason was that it is often time consuming and resource intensive to prove gang membership and/or attribute gang related motives to the offenses and offenders (Johnson, Webster, Connors, and Saenz, 1994).

California and Nevada have both experimented with sentencing enhancements aimed at curtailing gang membership and gang related violence. At the height of gang violence and full-blown gang warfare, during 1993, the California legislature passed its comprehensive Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP). STEP contained two major provisions: 1) the creation of a new criminal act for knowingly and willfully furthering felonious crime by members of a criminal street gang and 2) a sentencing enhancement for any felony or misdemeanor committed to further the benefits of a street gang.

Offenders sentenced under the enhancement provisions could receive
two to four additional years in prison for minor felonies, five years for serious felonies, an additional 10 years for violent felonies and life in prison for carjackings and drive-by shootings. While the STEP Act has not been subjected to a rigorous and systematic evaluation it is not possible to ascertain how this legislative act has impacted the gang situation in California. Anecdotal evidence and media accounts appear to indicate that the STEP Act has not had a significant impact on the gang problem in Los Angeles (Greene and Pranis, 2007).

Several years prior to California’s STEP Act the Nevada Legislature enacted similar statutes which directly targeted gang members and gang crime. The length of confinement was automatically doubled for any crime committed in an effort to further or promote gang activities and discharging firearms from a motor vehicle (drive-by shootings) charges were enhanced.

An evaluation of Nevada’s sentencing initiative by Miethe and McCorkle (2002) found fewer charges and convictions than anticipated. A total of 41 convictions, out of 287 charges, (14 %) were obtained under the doubling of confinement length provision and a lower conviction rate (10%) under the drive-by legislation. The researchers also noted that while most judges viewed gang statutes favorably, the surveyed prosecutors were mixed in their viewpoints on enhancement penalties.

Most prosecutors reported that enhancements for school–related crimes and firearm forfeitures were not reducing the level of gang crime in their jurisdictions. However, enhancement statutes were useful for obtaining pleas on other charges as defendants who were threatened with a conviction, under an enhanced gang statute, would choose to plead guilty to a lesser charge to avoid the additional sanctions associated with being found guilty of gang-related offenses.

Bjerregaard (2003) comments that anti-gang legislation offers a promising tool for targeting the most hard core gang members but
without being derived from empirical research data these initiatives may not only fail but backfire and unfairly and unintentionally end up targeting only members of inner city minority communities. She further adds that these types of legislation have not turned out to be the panacea as once envisioned and notes that the lack of any real scientific and systematic evaluations of these strategies preclude any definitive comments regarding their efficacy and ability to deter gang related criminal activity.

A more recent statewide study on Florida’s gangs reports that over one-half of the surveyed prosecutors in 2006 filed less than five cases under the state’s Criminal Street Gang Prevention Act while 40 percent stated that they had filed more then 50 cases in the same year. The study’s authors also note that two-thirds of the respondents suggested that gang-related prosecutions had increased over the last two years with 40 percent of this number reporting that prosecutions for gang-related violent crime had significantly increased. (Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 2007).

More systematic research has been conducted on the use of civil injunctions as a strategy for curbing gangs and gang activities. Typically, a civil injunction will be served on an individual gang which seeks to prohibit loitering, curfew violations, vandalism, selling drugs, trespassing and even the display of gang clothing, gang hand signs and other gang-related paraphernalia. Gang members who violate this injunction may be tried in civil and/or criminal court. Grogger (2002) evaluated 14 separate gang injunctions which were issued in Los Angeles County between 1993 and 1998. Salient findings included a 5 to 10 percent reduction in assaultive violent crime, for those areas covered by an injunction compared to a matched non-injunction area, with no significant reductions in property crime.

Maxson, Hennigan and Sloane (2005) found significant short-term or immediate effects in improved community perceptions of safety, less gang presence and intimidation, as well as less fear of confrontations
with gang members when measuring citizens’ perceptions of their neighborhood before and after an injunction was issued. The researchers noted no significant long-term effects on reducing social disorganization, improving neighborhood quality or strengthening police-community relations. The study authors conclude that the use of civil injunctions may produce modest immediate improvements. However, coupling injunctions with efforts to improve community organization and provide alternative programs for gang members might substantially improve the effectiveness of civil injunctions to reduce gangs.

In summary, there is scant research on the effectiveness and efficacy of increasing penalties, to prevent, deter and mitigate gang activity, and study findings are mixed or inconclusive. To paraphrase Papachristos (2005) one or two studies doesn’t get it, we simply don’t know if gangbuster type bills actually deter gang crime.

**How gang-specific programs affect North Carolina’s communities**

Many of the gang specific programs in North Carolina are in an infancy stage. Currently, the majority of these programs seem to either be collecting data or are planning to collect data in the future. Since these programs are new, data on program activities and results, both short-term and long-term, are either incomplete or simply unknown. Therefore, the effectiveness of these programs cannot be accurately assessed to date.

Please note that the following information is based on a small group of responding gang specific programs. Therefore, caution should be exercised when making generalizations about all North Carolina gang specific programs.

8. This number includes members from those reported gangs with only one or two members and is slightly higher than the 14,500 noted above which was obtained after removing those groups with fewer than three members.
• The 37 gang specific programs that responded to the Governor’s Crime Commission survey represent 20 counties: Alamance, Cabarrus, Catawba, Chatham, Chowan, Craven, Duplin, Durham, Forsyth, Gaston, Guilford, Harnett, Henderson, Lenoir, Pender, Pitt, Rockingham, Union, Wake, and Wayne.

• Nineteen of the 37 gang specific programs have been at least partially funded by the North Carolina Governor’s Crime Commission.

• Of the 36 gang specific programs responding, eighty-six percent have been in operation for two years or less with the majority of these being in operation for one year or less. Only five programs had been in operation for more than two years.10

• Of the 36 gang specific programs responding, half indicated that their program had completed a community capacity assessment in which needs were compared with resources to satisfy those needs before implementation. Of the remaining 18 programs, 11 were unsure as to whether such an assessment had been completed.

• Of the 34 gang specific programs responding, eighty-eight percent stated that their program networked effectively with related programs.

• Of the 30 gang specific programs responding, seventy-seven percent stated that their program networked effectively with faith-based organizations.

• All 31 gang specific programs responding stated that their program networked effectively with government agencies.

9. Umemoto’s ethnographic work traces the rise and fall of a gang war in Venice, California and documents the deleterious effects that can occur when suppression tactics are not balanced with community involvement and simultaneously occurring intervention and prevention programs.
• Of the 36 gang specific programs responding, ninety-two percent indicated that data collected by their program were used to manage and improve performance of the program.

• Of the 36 gang specific programs responding, seventy-two percent collect or plan to collect long-term performance data on the targeted population. Of the remaining 10 programs, half were unsure as to whether any long-term data would be collected on the targeted population.

• Of the 35 gang specific programs responding, fifty-one percent collect or plan to collect long-term performance data on past participants. Of the remaining 17 programs, 11 were unsure as to whether any long-term data would be collected on past participants.

• Of the 35 gang specific programs responding, forty percent have formally attempted or will formally attempt to be included as a line item in a local or state government’s budget. Of the remaining 21 programs, 15 were unsure as to whether attempts have occurred or will occur.

Gang-Specific Prevention Programs

• A total of 13,086 individuals were served in 2006 by 17 responding gang specific programs with a prevention component. A wide range of individuals were served, as one program served eight clients while another served 4,142.

• Of the 28 responding gang specific programs with a prevention component, sixty-one percent serve both youth and adults.

• Of the 27 responding gang specific programs with a prevention component, eighty-five percent provide year-round
services.

- Of the 27 responding gang specific programs with a prevention component, fifty-nine percent offer mentoring services, thirty percent offer tutoring services, forty-four percent offer counseling services, forty-eight percent offer life-skills and enrichment activities, and sixty-three percent provide conflict resolution services.

- Of the 24 responding gang specific programs with a prevention component, only half collected baseline data before services were implemented.

- Very little results data were collected by programs on clients’ behavior while participating in the program (e.g., whether clients committed a criminal offense while in the program, whether clients exhibited improvements in behavior, etc.).

**Gang-Specific Intervention Programs**

- Of the seven responding gang specific programs with an intervention component, a total of 2,946 individuals were served in 2006. Programs served a wide range of individuals as the smallest number of individuals served was eight and the largest equaled 1,130.

- Of the 14 responding gang specific programs with an intervention component, sixty-four percent serve both youth and adults.

- All 13 responding gang specific programs with an intervention component provide year-round services.

- Of the 12 responding gang specific programs with an intervention component, fifty-eight percent offer mentoring services, forty-two percent offer tutoring services, sixty-seven
percent offer counseling services, sixty-seven percent offer life-skills and enrichment activities, and eighty-three percent provide conflict resolution services.

- Of the nine responding gang specific programs with an intervention component, seventy-eight percent collected baseline data before services were implemented.

- Again, very little results data were collected by programs on clients’ behavior while participating in the program (e.g., whether clients committed a criminal offense while in the program, whether clients exhibited improvements in behavior, etc.).

Gang-Specific Suppression Programs

- Of the 17 responding gang specific programs with a suppression component, only forty-seven percent collected baseline data before services were implemented.

- In terms of suppression tactics used in 2006, of the 17 responding gang specific programs with a suppression component, seventy-one percent used confidential informants; thirty-five percent used undercover officers; eighty-two percent oversaw surveillance/arrests, buy/busts, reverse sting operations; fifty-nine percent administered interdiction methods/sweeps/execution of warrants; fifty-nine percent were part of a multijurisdictional task force; eighty-two percent used Community-Oriented Policing; seventy-seven percent replied that patrols were directed; and twenty-nine percent used nuisance abatement techniques.

- 18,939 hours were spent administering suppression tactics in 2006 by eight responding gang specific programs.
• 2,446 hours of training, specific to gangs, were provided to staff in 2006 by eleven responding gang specific programs.

• Only one-third of responding gang specific programs with a suppression component were able to report the number of gang-related arrests in their area and only two-thirds were able to report the number of suspected gang members in their area.

• Very few of the responding gang specific programs with a suppression component were able to report on the number of gang members prosecuted in their area.

• Only eight gang specific programs with a suppression component were able to report on the number of firearms seized in 2006 as a result of gang-related firearm violations in their area.

• Only three gang specific programs with a suppression component were able to report the total street value of all drug seizures, forfeitures, and confiscations resulting from gang-related activities.

• Twenty-three percent of the 13 responding gang specific programs with a suppression component assessed citizens’ perceptions of crime in 2006.

**Gang Prevention, Deterrence and Suppression in North Carolina**

The North Carolina Department of Correction has been tracking security threat groups, a term synonymous with gangs, for over 20 years. The DOC has been noted for their progressive stance on such groups. In a state that has not had the problems of tradition gangs and their rivalries, DOC noted the potential problems of such groups and developed a proactive approach to maintain intelligence on inmates who had been

10. Not all of the 37 respondents were able to answer every question thus the summary results may include less than 37 responses for some of the questions.
validated as threat group members. Their validation process insured that only individuals that met selected criteria would be identified as such. This process has served the Division of Prisons well and has been extended to the Division of Community Corrections who are now able to validate individuals on probation prior to future incarceration. This step helps to identify such people prior to intake and thus could prevent potential problems associated with housing a new inmate with a rival group.

For nearly three decades the State Bureau of Investigation has followed traditional outlaw motorcycle gangs, white supremacists, and hate groups that fit this study’s definition of gang. Meetings with law enforcement across the state that maintain intelligence information on groups in their jurisdictions have been involved in sharing this information with the SBI and other law enforcement. This has now evolved into including the criminal gangs most readily identified with when the word “gang” is used today. The group of law enforcement officers who specialize in tracking such groups has risen over the past decade leading to better intelligence on such groups and a greater willingness to acknowledge the menacing problems associated with these gangs existence.

**Support by the Governor’s Crime Commission**

For over a decade the Governor’s Crime Commission has provided funding to local law enforcement and community groups to combat problems associated with criminal gang involvement be they juvenile, youthful offenders or adults. The Fayetteville Police Department and Forsyth County Sheriff’s Office received two of the earliest such grants to provide for the sharing of expertise and to train other law enforcement in the recognition of gang activity in other jurisdictions. This need to share information lead to the establishment of the North Carolina Gang Investigators Association (NCGIA) which received several educational grants to provide training to law enforcement agencies that had limited resources and otherwise may not have had an ability to identify a community gang presence.
Today there is no jurisdiction in the state that has not been afforded an opportunity to benefit from GCC gang prevention and intervention funding. North Carolina GangNet is offered free to interested law enforcement agencies to provide more accurate information sharing on gangs and gang member activities. The NCGIA continues to provide first class training to local law enforcement. The North Carolina Department of Justice criminal justice academies establish programs on gang recognition and intervention. Other state and local agencies and non-profit organizations also have received funding from the GCC to recognize, prevent, deter and/or intervene in gang activity.

**Some Promising Gang Programs In North Carolina**

While collaborations are significant in combating the gang problem, they too can break-down and leave a community without the intended services. This has happened several times across the state. However, there are two holistic programs of note which are housed within law enforcement agencies that seek to provide all the services of identification, deterrence, prevention, intervention and suppression. These two programs are the New Hanover County Sherriff’s Office Gang Task Force (NH GTF) and the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department’s Gang of One. Both programs provide a model of stability in the prevention and intervention arena and also have the intelligence and suppression offered by law enforcement.

The NH GTF is the only full service prevention, intervention and suppression unit on which any information can be found on. This initiative offers everything from mental health services such as counseling, diversion programs after school and on weekends, mentoring and the information and legal authority of the Sheriff’s Office. What is so unique is the services are all provided by Sheriff’s Office personnel. There is a clinical social worker who goes into the schools and housing projects, develops programs and activities as well as offers counseling.
They have case managers and deputies assigned to the NH GTF that actively participate in each youth’s progress acting as mentors. This innovative approach allows the clinical social worker to assist in determining if a child is at risk for gang involvement rather than waiting for referrals that often times are delayed due to labeling concerns by school resource officers, school counselors, teachers or administrators. The New Hanover County Sheriff’s Office has literally cut through all of the red tape and concerns of many by forming agreements with the school system and community groups to aid in providing a full service gang prevention, intervention and suppression unit.

In Charlotte, the Gang of One program has many of the same features but is less ambitious than the NH GTF. Gang of One offers a full spectrum of services to youths that have been identified as at risk for gang involvement. This program seeks to identify needs and place the referred youths in the appropriate programs across the county. Gang of One has identified many programs and community sponsored activities and developed agreements to provide services. This program is a model for law enforcement agencies that seek to be a referral source for prevention and intervention due to the capital intensive nature of a program such as in New Hanover County. This program recognizes the need for one source to have an understanding of all available resources in a community to battle the problems for youths of association in gang activities. This program is funded under a US Department of Justice Project Safe Neighborhoods grant through the Governor’s Crime Commission.

**Lessons Learned:**

“Resources are out there to address this problem. You have to develop a strategy and be the catalyst to bring those resources together to function effectively and efficiently to accomplish the common goal.” US Conference of Mayors Best Practices

Don’t be naive. Don’t wait for the problem to go away. Be very proactive. If you start getting information that there could possibly be a gang in your city, then do your best to educate everyone who could come in contact with the suspected gang so they can help you know what you’re facing. Then take your best course of action to approach the problem. Try to get it stopped while it still might be a youth gang before they develop into a hardcore gang. If you have a hardcore gang, put pressure on them by being proactive, being present and doing everything you can, so they do not get out of control.” US Conference of Mayors Best Practices


While this publication offers some examples from North Carolina, it became obvious that these programs have limited impact. In Durham a program funded under a US Department of Justice Project Safe
Neighborhoods grant through the Governor’s Crime Commission, seeks to place a gang intervention specialist on the streets of the city to be a liaison between law enforcement, community outreach programs and youths on the streets involved or at risk for becoming involved in gang activities. At the time of publication there was no data on this program effectiveness. The program was established in August 2006. Durham County Sheriff’s Office and Durham Police Department have gang units and have been a leader in the statewide GangNet program. Also, the Streetwalker program is one of many valuable initiatives in the Durham area.

The Gastonia Police Department established an outreach and education program that can best be described as community policing. By defining gangs as a community problem and involving schools, community groups, community watch and local business people, this program embodies community policing philosophies. The Police Department has officers trained in understanding and identifying gangs and gang graffiti. This program also reaches out to the school system by providing drug and gang resistance education to students, teachers and administrators. The effectiveness have been that there was no noted increase in new membership in the three gangs identified and that the police and community are not being complacent in the recognition and identification of gang activities.

Created in April 2001, the gang component of the Greensboro Police Department’s Special Intelligence Section was created to identify gang activities and work in community awareness and gang prevention. The police noted a presence of gangs and gang-related activities and determined there was a need for detectives to be trained in gang behaviors. The district attorney’s office (DA) in Guilford County devoted an assigned assistant district attorney to handle cases involving validated gang members charged in criminal offenses. Working with the DA and other community groups, this program is designed to provide community...
awareness and training and to facilitate the prosecution of validated gang members.

**General Assembly funded Grants Through the Governor’s Crime Commission**

In 2006, the North Carolina General Assembly allocated $1.5 million dollars to the Governor’s Crime Commission to fund state and local gang prevention and intervention programs. Descriptions of these programs follow. The GCC identified several jurisdictions that had been underserved in this area with the limited federal funding for gang prevention and intervention in their annual grant process. While these programs have not been in existence long enough to offer evaluative data on their effectiveness, the usage of these funds should be identified.

*Gang Grants from 2005-2007*

*General Assembly Appropriations*
**Comprehensive Gang Initiative Program**

**Implementing Agency:** Cabarrus County Sheriff’s Office  
**Area Served:** Cabarrus County  
**Director:** Captain Phillip Patterson, 704 920-3005  
**Funding:** $100,006

**Overview**

The strategies behind this project are to develop and implement a countywide attack on its gang problem which is most troubling in its school systems and community. The project uses data and intelligence gathering, enforcement strategies, and prevention and intervention activities to reduce gang activity. Officials have identified at least a dozen gangs, most of which have national affiliations such as the Crips, MS-13, KKK, Black Piston’s, Brown Pride, Aryan Brotherhood and Sur13. They have been linked to many serious crimes in Cabarrus County.

A collaboration of community partners assembled by the project safe neighborhoods (PSN) Executive Committee for Cabarrus County is guiding strategy based on:

- **Investigations** – A countywide intelligence data base will be built using surveillance equipment and data management technology.
- **Prevention** – A team of law enforcement officers will be sent to the Chicago Police Department for an internship in gang prevention. Additionally, they will be trained on-site in gang awareness and prevention techniques to be able to offer community education briefings.
Objectives

The Comprehensive Gang Initiative Program seeks to provide Cabarrus County with the capability to implement effective, comprehensive gang prevention and control programs with the following goals:

- Disseminate effective gang prevention information to schools, agencies, groups, and churches.
- Identify and remove graffiti from each effected neighborhood.
- Identify programs for prevention, controlling gang-related drug trafficking, and violence.
- Create a gang database that includes entry into DCI and GangNet.

Accomplishments

The Cabarrus County Regional Gang Intelligence Network has met monthly to discuss equipment needs to carry out best practices for intelligence gathering and to share gang intelligence information among other law entities that is gathered from schools, businesses, and citizen leads. All participating agencies have had gang investigators trained for GangNet use. Investigators are also in the process of training other agency personnel how to access read-only data in GangNet for use in the field. The Network has also disseminated a gang prevention message through gang presentations to schools, civic groups, neighborhood and community programs, churches, businesses, and service providers. Over 3,000 individuals have attended the various presentations. Prevention programs from Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT), and the Boys and Girls Club of Cabarrus County, are offered to youth at-risk and their families. Other awareness strategies are currently still in development. In particular the project has:

Provided instructional resources to Kannapolis and Cabarrus County School systems and printed informational gang booklets to warn the public of the dangers of gangs and methods to confront
gang activities.

- Noted and photographed all gang graffiti. The City of Concord has passed an ordinance to remove graffiti.

- Partnered with the Boys and Girls Club with the ‘Street Smart” anti-gang training. Project staff have held stakeholder meetings with school systems, the parks and recreation department, social workers, and law enforcement agencies to begin a comprehensive approach to reduce at-risk youth gang involvement.

- Worked with the schools, Department of Correction, probation, and the jail to identify gang members and build a comprehensive GangNet database for the county.

Gang Resistance and Intervention Program (GRIP)

Implementing Agency: Chatham County Sheriff’s Office
Area Served: Chatham County
Project Director: Captain Charles Gardner (919) 542-2811
Funding: $99,982

Overview

This project is developing a multi-jurisdictional partnership to develop a countywide system for tracking, analyzing, and reporting gang activity. The system enhances gang prevention and intervention through public and school education and specialized programs. Citizens and a coalition of community leaders are acting to build a comprehensive anti-gang strategy with associated capacity to confront gangs. They plan to do this with a three pronged plan to educate the community and prevent and intervene in gang activity.
Objectives

The project goals aim to fill the service gaps in the anti-gang strategy:

- Ensure that all law enforcement offices, schools and others involved with juveniles have current information on gang activities thereby enfolding them in the countywide strategy to address gangs.

- Reduce youth participation in gangs through enhanced prevention and intervention strategies such as Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) and provide more out-of-school opportunities for youth. This strategy will require a large resources development campaign.

Accomplishments

Gang Coordinator, Cpl. Raymond Barrios, and the Division Commander, Captain Charles Gardner, have made 16 gang awareness presentations in churches and schools, reaching over 500 adults and 200 children. Further presentations have been given to county offices and civic organizations.

The gang coordinator and two school resource officers have been sent to GangNet and Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) classes. These officers have started GREAT in the county middle and elementary schools. Kathy Hodges, Family Violence Rape Crisis, Co-Executive Director, observed:

“It was really important to get this information out to the community through our conference and I know that most people who attended were stunned by the extent of the problem. Family Violence Rape Crisis will continue to support the efforts of the Chatham County Sheriff’s Office and their gang unit in ending gang violence.”
The newly formed Chatham County Gang Task Force is employing a community approach to intervene, suppress and prevent gang activity. Chatham County anti-gang partners currently include school resource officers, the Department of Juvenile Justice, Pittsboro Police Department, Siler City Police Department, the district attorney’s office, Family Violence/Rape Crisis, NC Probation and Parole, the Hispanic liaison, and Chatham Citizen Corps.

“The gang officer with the sheriff’s office has been a crucial part of the judicial process as it pertains to the prosecution of gang related crimes in Chatham County.” Marcie Trageser, Chatham County Assistant District Attorney

Community Action

Implementing Agency: City of Dunn
Area Served: Harnett County
Director: Lieutenant Rodney Rowland, 910-892-1873
Funding: $99,872

Overview

This project aims to reduce gang activity in Harnett County by collaborating with law enforcement, the faith community, civic groups, medical professionals, youth organizations, county agencies, and especially the citizens. Harnett County has most major national gangs represented. With this grant, the county collaboration will implement a two pronged countywide strategy of intervention and prevention.
Objectives

The full circle program will present alternatives to gang involved youth and those at risk of gang involvement by:

- Conducting gang identification and reporting training to sworn officers.
- Training the Community Action Committee and citizens on basic gang identification and awareness techniques.
- Teaching Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) to elementary and middle school students.
- Having all law enforcement and the citizens identify and report gang activities.
- Involving at-risk and former gang members in prevention and intervention programs.
- Providing community action committee resources to gang involved youth.

Accomplishments

This project started with a coalition of four local law enforcement agencies. The Dunn Police Department built its own gang task force of eight part-time and one full-time officer to document gang activity and target resources. “The Dunn Police Department is in the process of conducting its first ‘call-in’ to put hard core gang members on notice to mend their ways or suffer the consequences,” noted Lieutenant Rodney Rowland. In particular project staff have:

- Conducted training seminars, including GangNet training, for all area law enforcement officers. Basic gang identification and awareness, prevention and intervention training continues with civic and nongovernmental agencies.
• Conducted GREAT training in all elementary schools. GREAT is progressing in all middle schools.

• Documented all gang activity, which is shared with all five county municipalities. Also, citizens now have a way to report gang activity.

• Conducted a countywide graffiti cleanup.

• Involved youth at risk of gang activity in the police athletic league prevention program; 350 youth are involved in a range of programs such as tutoring and athletics.

“Harnett County will continue to build upon its gang strategy by this partnership with the General Assembly and the Governor’s Crime Commission,” stated Lieutenant Rowland.

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**Gang Resistance**

**Implementing Agency:** Duplin County Sheriff’s Office

**Area Served:** Duplin County

**Director:** Sheriff Blake Wallace, 910 - 296-2150

**Funding:** $74,964

**Overview**

This grant helps pay officer overtime for anti-gang activities. Duplin County is experiencing significant increases in gang activity. For example, MS-13 is responsible for murder, home invasions, drug trafficking and armed robberies. The sheriff is heading a multi-agency task force which includes the State Bureau of Investigation, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, and the Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms agency to meet gang activity head on.

**Objectives**

The increased officer presence will:

- Increase arrests of gang-related crime.
- Set up community watch programs.
- Begin primary school anti-gang education such as Gang Resistance Education and Training.

**Accomplishments**

Sheriff Blake Wallace stated, “The collaboration between the Duplin County Sheriff’s Office Gang Task Force, the General Assembly, and the Crime Commission has already resulted in the apprehension of several known MS-13 gang members.” According to the sheriff, some of the arrested gang members came to Duplin County with the sole purpose of establishing a continuing criminal enterprise and many relocated to Duplin County from other states with extensive criminal histories and outstanding warrants at the time of their arrests. “Continued proactive measures will be utilized in an effort to eliminate and deter future illegal gang activity,” commented Sheriff Wallace.

**Gang Intelligence and Prevention Officer**

**Implementing Agency:** Edgecombe County Sheriff’s Office  
**Area Served:** Edgecombe County  
**Director:** Sheriff James Knight, 252-641-7915  
**Funding:** $68,470
Overview

This project establishes a gang intelligence office under the leadership of the sheriff. The county is experiencing a sudden growth of gangs. What is most disturbing is that gang recruitment and activities are centered in primary schools, especially at county middle schools. Local community advocates, decision makers and leaders looked to the sheriff for a plan of action. He established a permanent task force to prevent gang growth and activities and educate the public about the county gang problem and what to do about it.

Objectives

The anti-gang task force, coordinated by the new gang intelligence and prevention officer, seeks to disrupt illegal gang activities, educate the public about gangs, and lessen the negative impact gangs have on the community by:

- Identifying gangs and gang members in the Edgecombe area.
- Educating the public on the gangs operating in their community.
- Conducting gang activity disruption operations.
- Conducting detention officer gang education and identification classes.

Accomplishments

- **GangNet** - The gang intelligence and prevention officer has been trained in and is using GangNet. He maintains files on all validated and suspected gang members in the County. Over thirty-five active gang members operating in at least nine different gangs are being monitored.
- **Collaboration** - The Edgecombe County sheriff’s office has entered into an agreement with the Tarboro police department, Pinetops police department, and Princeville police department to share
gang information and cooperate on gang disruption operations.

- **Community Awareness** - The gang officer has given 11 public awareness seminars to community groups, school faculty, and business organizations. These seminars have been attended by more than 550 people who also received gang awareness informational brochures. The gang officer has made contact with the managers of four housing communities in the county and counseled them on how to recognize gang graffiti and dress.

- **In-service Training** - An in-service class was given to all detention personnel on gang recognition. A system was set up that allows them to easily inform the gang officer of suspected jail gang activity.

Gang activity disruption operations began in the early part of 2008. The gang officer has set up operations that will include the narcotics division, the special response team, the Tarboro police department gang officer, the Princeville police department, the Pinetops police department, and K-9 officers. The gang officer has spoken to four public housing managers about community clean-up programs. Some of the managers have expressed interest in participating in such operations during the spring. “The sheriff’s anti-gang initiative will continue to grow,” according to Linda Powell, a member of the sheriff’s staff.
A Comprehensive Assessment of Gangs in North Carolina: A Report to the General Assembly

**Gang Reduction Initiative Project (GRIP)**

*Implementing Agency:* Goldsboro Police Department  
*Area Served:* Goldsboro  
*Director:* Sgt. Dorothy Ardes, 919-580-4245  
*Funding:* $98,144

**Overview**

This grant funds officer overtime to increase enforcement and a 100% zero tolerance policy on gangs and gang activity. The Goldsboro police department has noticed a disturbing increase in home grown gangs, which presents a unique difficulty, community fear from ‘one of their own.’ Under the leadership of the chief, officers will suppress illegal gang activities with surveillance and proactive patrol.

**Objectives**

The Goldsboro PD will decrease criminal gang activity by:

- Decreasing the number of deadly assaults committed by and against known gang members.
- Identifying known gang members and their crimes.
- Making it difficult for known gang members to carry out their illegal activities by having a visible law enforcement presence in gang territories.
- Documenting citywide graffiti.
Accomplishments

The project director, Sgt. Dorothy Ardes, commented, “Without the General Assembly and GCC supported grant, the police department would have less contact with gang members and would not be as effective in curtailting their influence in the community.” In particular, the project has:

- Successfully identified over 16 new gang members to add to the database of known gang members.
- Made it more difficult for gang members to carry out their criminal enterprises by concentrating efforts around known gang strongholds within the community. The police department has shut down five gang drug houses.
- Photographed and documented every new instance of gang graffiti within the city.

Feedback from citizens has been most positive and encouraging:

“The neighbors of the 200 and 300 blocks of Leslie Street would like to say thank you for your efforts to clean up the streets. Your actions are proving to be positive and there is a definite difference . . . your efforts are not in vain. It’s nice to get up in the middle of the night, look outside your window and see nobody in the streets and listen to total quiet. Once again, thank you for all your efforts and hard work. Please share this with your staff and city council members.” Milton H.
Gang Project

Implementing Agency: Harnett County Sheriff’s Office
Area Served: Harnett County
Director: Major Gary McNeill, 910- 893-7103
Funding: $75,662

Overview

This project is to establish a gang specialist within the sheriff’s office to assist the gang advisory committee in implementing a comprehensive plan to confront gangs and gang activity. Citizens and leaders are concerned that gangs are established and gang activity is on the rise in the county. The sheriff has organized a coalition of decision makers to take action to combat gangs and the problems they cause via police presence, education and awareness, prevention, intervention, and suppression strategies. The steering committee chaired by Attorney Jon Powell, Campbell University Professor, assessed the services provided in Harnett County and concluded:

- Organizations and mechanisms to affect change in Harnett County exist, but are decentralized.
- Youth residing in the Western Side of Harnett County do not have access to a local government lead recreation type program for example, police athletic league (PAL).
Burgeoning anti-gang resources for program planning on the

- Western side of the county requires more time than any one member of the coalition can devote; moreover, involvement with the coalition is not priority for any one member.

- Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Middle, GREAT Families, and GREAT Summers components should be the crux of gang-prevention or intervention efforts.

- Dunn PAL is willing to expand and share resources in an effort to bring a PAL to the western side of the county.

**Objectives**

The coalition headed by the sheriff aims to reduce illegal gangs, gang membership and their activities by:

- Developing a countywide comprehensive gang plan.

- Establishing an intelligence database.

- Reducing gang-related crimes.

- Lessening public fear of gangs.

**Accomplishments**

Since the project is still in planning and initial stages of implementation, it is too early to determine if gang crimes have been affected and that the public fear of gangs and gang activity has been reduced. Thus far, the project has:

**GREAT programming** - In 2006, the Harnett County Sheriff’s Office began to teach the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) in the middle schools in Harnett County. During this pilot stage 12 middle school classes were served; reaching 323 students in the 7th grade. In addition, 23 elementary classes were served; reaching 542 students in the 5th grade. The program was well received by the staff and students
and was officially endorsed by the Harnett County Schools as well as the sheriff’s office.

- **Collaboration** – The sheriff initiated the Harnett County gang coalition. This coalition is comprised of representatives from local police municipalities (Dunn, Erwin, Lillington, Coats, and Angier), Harnett County DJJDP, NC DOC: Probation and Parole, Harnett County Schools, Harnett County Joblinks, Harnett County Youth Services, Harnett County Board of Commissioners, DSS, District Attorney’s Office, Alcohol and Drug Services, Re-Entry, NC Cooperative Extension and area churches. The Coalition then formed a steering committee consistent with the Federal OJJDP’s Comprehensive Gang Model.

- **Intelligence gathering** – A gang data base has been started to collect intelligence from citizens, deputies, detention and other sources.

Sheriff Larry Rollins observed:

“Gang related issues have been on the rise in Harnett County and our region for several years. Thanks to a grant from the General Assembly via the Governors Crime Commission, we were able to position one detective as our gang specialist and begin a countywide anti-gang initiative. We have conducted much training throughout the Office to familiarize all our staff with gang identifiers and gang reporting techniques. We also have mutual cooperative agreements with all our municipalities and several surrounding counties to assist each other as gang related issues arise. With this grant we developed the Harnett County Gang Coalition to make a stand and make a
Overview

This project is to fund overtime for Henderson Police Department anti-gang efforts. Like all communities in North Carolina, Henderson has noted a marked increase of gang activities which requires increased policing. The officers assigned to this program will work on gang suppression.

Objectives

Designated officers will identify and investigate gang activity and cooperate with other agencies to provide gang education and alternatives to gangs for at-risk youth by:

- Identifying at least three operating, organized ‘criminal enterprise’ gangs.
- Conducting Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) classes at local schools, Boys and Girls Clubs and Weed and Seed Sites.
- Conducting ‘Gang At-Risk’ and interdiction programs through the safe neighborhood council.
Accomplishments

- **Intervention and Suppression** - In 2007, officers of the Henderson Police Department worked 1,690 hours of directed and proactive patrol in the Henderson/Vance Weed and Seed Designated Areas with the most gang-related graffiti and activity. During those patrols 399 uniform citations were issued, 119 warrants for arrest were served, 20 on-site felony arrests, and 46 misdemeanor arrests were made. Seven illegal weapons charges were made, 128.79 grams of marijuana was seized, 19.51 grams of cocaine and illegal prescription drugs for oxycodone were made as well. This was in addition to patrol, criminal investigation, and narcotics officer’s anti-gang activities as part of their regular assignments. Drug arrests in the city of Henderson totaled 342 in 2007 as compared to 224 in 2006, 240 in 2005 and 192 in 2004. Since the middle of 2005, patrol officers have increased enforcement due to officers working overtime to cover shift shortages due to a high level of personnel turnover at the Henderson police department. Increased enforcement in this area has built new working relationships with several Community Watch groups in the city.

- **Collaboration** - One of the groups identified as being a continuing criminal enterprise was taken into custody following an investigation during October 2007. The investigation of this group was conducted in cooperation with the ATF and US attorney's office. Three suspects were charged in federal court with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine and being an armed career criminal. Investigations on at least two other groups are ongoing.

Chief of Police Keith Sidwell commented to the local press following these arrests that "With this type of prosecution, these individuals receive
much longer prison sentences.” This initiative will continue and more arrests are pending. The chief also mentioned that he would purchase the remaining authorized equipment, additional training for officers, public education and presentation efforts, and directed, planned enforcement efforts designed to address gang and drug related activities within the city of Henderson.

### Henderson County Gang Prevention Partnership

**Implementing Agency:** Henderson County Sheriff’s Office  
**Area Served:** Henderson County  
**Director:** Captain Rick Davis, 828-697-4536  
**Funding:** $99,080

### Overview

The Henderson County sheriff is taking a proactive approach to the county’s growing gang presence and subsequent problems by forming and staffing a partnership to confront gangs and gang activity. This cooperative grant will be used to hire a sworn officer and an unsworn outreach coordinator to staff the partnership of local law enforcement, courts, correction, public services, and non-governmental officials and organizations. Their purpose is to develop and implement a countywide anti-gang strategy.

### Objectives

**Tattoo locations on the body are not random**

The gang enforcement officer will attend to gang relevant prevention, intervention, suppression and community development. The
outreach coordinator will work with Henderson County citizens and especially the large Hispanic community to deter gang involvement by:

- Creating a working team
- Removing graffiti
- Implementing community development and outreach
- Creating stronger relations with the Latino community
- Educating students about gangs
- Educating the community about gangs
- Increasing public awareness about gangs
- Reducing gang related violence

Accomplishments

- **Public Awareness** – The anti-gang coordinator, Detective Hill, has conducted gang awareness classes for law enforcement, school officials, community groups and state agencies. He works closely with county school resource officers, especially in middle schools.

- **Gang Data Base** – Detective Hill has had many one-on-one interviews with gang members. A detailed data base is under construction.

- **Outreach** – A bi-lingual and bi-cultural Latino Outreach Coordinator has been hired to facilitate interaction, interpretation, and intelligence gathering with the largely Latino gang presence. The Latino coordinator also spends much time in the school system, especially at the middle school level, conducting gang awareness informational counseling and training.

Captain Charlie McDonald has watched the rapid growth of this program:

“The success of this program is evident in the fact that our agency is now
aware of the gang issue and our officers are more able to recognize gang affiliation. Our patrol now has a code for gang calls for service. This is facilitated by the working relationship Detective Hill has established parole and probation office, the district attorney’s office, and those involved in the enforcement process. We are now better able to identify and attend to individuals involved in gang activity."

Gang Enforcement and Intervention

Implementing Agency: Iredell County Sheriff’s Office
Area Served: Iredell County
Director: Captain Mike Phillips, 704 - 924-4069
Funding: $90,871

Overview
This cooperative project establishes a gang data base and begins an anti-gang strategy based on prevention, suppression, and interdiction. The Iredell County Sheriff’s Office (ICSO) observed the significant growth and migration of organized gangs from Charlotte and Mecklenburg County. More and more arrests are associated with illicit gang activity.

Objectives
This grant sets up four gang specialists for each of the sheriff’s squads. These gang specialists will head the sheriff’s office anti-gang strategies and coordinate community and stakeholder anti-gang efforts by:

- Identifying, arresting and convicting gang offenders.
- Presenting educational programs to schools and the community to increase gang awareness.
• Working with community organizations to offer alternatives to gang involvement such as athletics and the arts.

Accomplishments

• **Athletics** - The ICSO partnered with two local sports groups to help provide gang programs through a competitive baseball environment. Players between the ages of 10 and 15 were coached in baseball, leadership, and life skills. Free baseball camps will be open to all youth in Iredell County by March 2008. Athletics are one part of the anti-gang strategy which provides alternatives to gang activity.

• **Mentoring** – The ICSO established a mentoring program through the Iredell Statesville School (ISS) system. This program partners a deputy of the sheriff's office with an at risk youth. The deputy meets with his or her assigned youth at least once a week to spend out-of-school time together.

• **GangNet** – The ICSO has trained five officers and administrative staff members to input, analyze and use GangNet information. This program will continue to grow as additional officers are trained on the GangNet System.

• **Rodney Monroe Basketball Camp** – The ICSO partnered with the Boys and Girls Club, Appropriate Punishment, Teen Health and ISS to present the first annual Rodney Monroe basketball camp which hosted 93 participants who were taught basketball skills, sportsmanship, and attended anti-gang presentations. These same participants were also taken to a Charlotte Bobcats basketball game free of charge. This program will be an annual event.

• **G.R.E.A.T** - To date we have trained five DARE officers to teach Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) in Iredell public
and private schools. Training for the remaining members of the DARE unit will be completed by summer 2008.

- **Gang Training** - All members of the ICSO received specialized gang training during the departmental in-service training week.

- **Community Programs** - ICSO staff have made more than 75 gang awareness presentations to community groups including churches, schools, civic groups and parent organizations.

- **Detention Center** - Program staff have trained a jail deputy to serve as the gang liaison for all duty squads in the detention center. This individual is responsible for the identification, interviewing and confirmation of all gang members that are arrested and brought to the Iredell County jail.

- **Surveillance Equipment** - To assist the investigation of criminal gangs, project staff are purchasing specialized investigative equipment consisting of video and still cameras equipped with infrared night vision. This equipment will help document and suppress countywide gang activity.

The project director, Captain Mike Phillips observed:

“This was very interested in forming partnerships with other groups and agencies within Iredell County to assist us in delivering the programs and identifying participants. These partnerships will endure thanks to this grant.”
Gang Awareness, Training, and Education (GATE)

Implementing Agency: Kinston Public Safety
Area Served: Kinston
Project Director: Greg Smith, 252-939-3224
Funding: $115,000

Overview
The Kinston Public Safety office received a grant from the Governor’s Crime Commission to provide prevention, intervention and suppression activities to reduce gang activities by addressing the needs of youth who wish to disassociate from gangs or gang activity. The grant will be used to renovate, supply, and equip a building as a youth center where teens at risk because of gang activity can come for an array of services.

Kinston suffered a brutal gang shootout which took the lives of a young girl and a young man. The Director of Public Safety, Greg Smith, could see that suppression was not the answer, ‘The community had to own the problem and the solution.” A coalition of community advocates, professionals from the courts, law enforcement, schools, social and mental services and especially the faith community committed to making a difference in the gang problem by declaring that all children and youth are at-risk. They started serving their young citizens with the ‘coffee house’ run by the Methodist Church which provided a safe and productive place for socialization. With this grant, they will expand the ‘coffee house’ meeting place concept with targeted services, education and training. Furthermore, the community has committed resources and funds to make the youth center permanent so they can begin making that difference in the community.
Objectives

The youth center will provide security and structured activities that will address contributing factors. The project also will increase suppression efforts by providing more cameras to monitor gang activity. The specific goals to be accomplished by the end of the grant.

- Reduce crime against persons committed by gang members by ten percent.
- Reduce crime against property (graffiti and vandalism) committed by gang members by 25 percent.
- Decrease the number of out-of-school suspensions by ten percent.

Accomplishments

Project officials began serving youth in the new GATE building in January 2008. They have an array of services such as job hunting and interviewing techniques, tutoring, and mentoring. The local community college offers GED education. They also have plans to expand services as resources and need determine. GATE is an example of the best of what the community can resolve to do. As Chief Smith observed, “This (project) is not just another basketball refuge; the youth center and the community will make a difference in many young lives.”

LaGrange Anti-Gang Resistance Group Effort (LARGE)

Implementing Agency: LaGrange Police Department
Area Served: LaGrange
Director: Jerry Davis, 252-566-3400
Funding: $65,982.00
Overview

This collaborative project promotes gang awareness and enhances departmental intervention, investigation and prosecution efforts. LaGrange is experiencing the increasing debilitating effects of gangs. The most disturbing fact is that LaGrange juveniles are increasingly becoming involved with gangs and illicit activity. This grant helps establish a departmental and citywide anti-gang strategy based on education and targeted, aggressive policing.

Objectives

The LaGrange police department is reducing gang related activities by educating police and the wider community and by saturating patrols in targeted areas. The police department is:

- Providing training to departmental officers on methods to combat gang growth and activities.
- Providing gang awareness education for the community.
- Reducing available locations for gang meetings and gathering places.
- Building an intelligence data base on violent gang members and sharing findings with other public and nongovernmental agencies.
- Reducing gang criminal activity via saturated patrols and aggressive enforcement.

Accomplishments

According to the project director and assistant chief of police, Jerry Davis, this project has provided the police department with the additional man hours to increase police presence in areas where gangs are most active. With the grant, observed Assistant Chief Davis, “There has been a drastic plunge in reported incidents of gang crimes.” In particular, the project has:
• Sent three officers to specialized training in gang investigation.

• Held presentations throughout the county.

• Eliminated several condemned buildings known to be bases for gang activity.

• Conducted saturated patrols to target gang members and get them off the street.

“The NC Department of Crime Control and Public Safety (through the Crime Commission) has done a fantastic job disseminating the General Assembly funds and by the and it is grants such as this that allow towns like La Grange to start a program that has the potential to grow through local dollars in the future.” stated Assistant Chief Davis.

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**Gang Task Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Served:</th>
<th>Craven County</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implementing Agency:</td>
<td>New Bern Police Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director:</td>
<td>Chief Frank Palombo, 252-672-4190</td>
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<td>Funding:</td>
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Overview
This project enables Craven County law enforcement agencies to better collaborate in efforts in dealing with the rise in gang presence and its associated criminal activity. Regular meetings provide the opportunity for timely information sharing amongst law enforcement agencies. In addition, the project educates and informs citizens, including children, about the signs and patterns of criminal activity associated with the presence of gangs.

Objectives
The task force aims to reduce illegal gangs and their activities by:

- Designating an officer in each participating agency to participate in monthly meetings at the New Bern police department in which information is shared concerning potential gang activity
- Using GangNet in all participating agencies
- Designing and distributing literature and video training to officers in gang prevention and recognition
- Designing and distributing literature and video training on gang recognition and prevention for the public
- Addressing gang membership to school age children in a seminar setting, as the local school system recognizes the need to address gang membership and preventive measures

Accomplishments
- Monthly meetings for the task force started in June 2007. Every law enforcement agency in Craven County is represented at monthly meetings regularly, along with members from the North Carolina Department of Correction (Craven Correctional Institute and Probation and Parole) and the North Carolina Department of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Information sharing on gangs and their activities has been the focus of each meeting.

- Equipment has been procured in order to be able to utilize GangNet in all agencies throughout the county. GangNet training occurred November 27-28, 2007 for half of the task force. The second half of the task force was trained January 24-25, 2008.

- Presentations created by members of the Craven County Gang Task Force are viewed at monthly meetings as a method of information exchange and training. With advancement in gang recognition, the task force is ready to start developing literature for partnering agencies to use as a tool in identifying gang signs, symbols, graffiti and behavior in an effort to educate the public.

- The task force is working to create a video for the community and for use at public safety events to create another avenue of educating the public. By educating the public on gang recognition, a link between citizens and law enforcement is formed. This, in turn, will foster tips from individuals when they recognize gang associations in their neighborhoods.

- The New Bern Police Department detective assigned to gang crime has been giving presentations to school age children in the community and in schools. Recently, the detective conducted a very successful teen gang violence workshop at a local non-profit group called Youth Vision, Inc. Future events are being scheduled with the Craven County Schools to reach out to more youth in the local area.

- Agencies on the task force made a combined total of 76 gang-related arrests in the second half of 2007.

“Through receiving the grant from the Governor’s Crime Commission with a mandate to form a task force, the local agencies that have come
together are committed to this project and will continue for years to come. Had the grant not directed a task force start, all participants that are involved in this effort would be missing an exceptional opportunity for information exchange. Creating the Craven County Gang Task Force has opened valuable lines of communication within local law enforcement agencies, corrections officers, and social service workers. The relationships built in the task force meetings will allow all agencies to work together on future endeavors. All participants are committed to continuing the task force and are vested in its success.”

- Excerpt from GCC progress report submitted by New Bern Police Chief Frank Palombo

Coalition Against Teen Gangs and Violence

Area Served: Rockingham County
Implementing Agency: Rockingham County Sheriff’s Office
Director: Sheriff Samuel Page, 336-634-3239
Funding: $74,999

Overview

This project is a collaborative effort among agencies in Rockingham County where overtime pay is provided to officers assisting the gang investigator as they work to identify gangs and track gang members, coordinate proactive enforcement and facilitate innovative gang prevention programs in order to reduce gang violence.

Objectives

The coalition, headed by the sheriff, aims to:

- Reduce the number of youth gang members in middle and high
schools by 15 percent during the 2006-07 school year and by 20 percent during the 2007-08 school year.

- Reduce the number of youth gang related incidents of crime and misbehavior at middle and high schools by 20 percent during the 2006-07 school year and by 25 percent during the 2007-08 school year.
- Increase the number of individuals, both parents and at-risk youth, who are referred by law enforcement officers for gang reduction intervention services by 25 percent.

Accomplishments

- Currently, statistics on the reduction of gang members or gang incidents in the school system have not been collected. The development of validation criteria has taken place and identification efforts are taking place. Since the grant began, 43 members, several in high school from at least 13 different gangs, have been validated.
- The sheriff’s office has started working with different organizations such as the Rockingham County S.C.O.R.E. Center, an alternative school providing targeted assistance to at-risk students, and the Rockingham County Youth Services, which provides counseling and other community alternatives for school-aged youth and their families with the goal of preventing initial or continued involvement with the juvenile justice system. Through this collaboration, the establishment of future gang intervention programs can be achieved.
- The district attorney’s office has been working with the sheriff’s office to give validated gang members stiffer penalties when sentenced.
- The gang resource officer has attended gang training conferences both in North Carolina and out-of-state.
• Overtime pay has been used to conduct investigations on gang related crimes. Recently, four detectives were paid overtime to investigate a stabbing involving two gang members. One arrest was made and another subject is going to be indicted.

• A total of 28 gang related arrests were made in the second half of 2007.

“Without the support of the Governor’s Crime Commission through this grant and the overtime money, we would not have identified these gangs and gang members. Being able to identify different gangs and gang members will tremendously help us in the future with preventing and solving crimes... I have been very fortunate to be able to attend some of the best training available due to the support of the Governor’s Crime Commission. Without funding from the GCC, I would not have been able to attend this valuable training. I will need to continue to attend this type of training in the future to stay abreast of the current gang trends. In turn, I can teach the other officers at my department what I have learned.”

-Detective Johnny Flynn, Gang Resource Officer
Rockingham County Sheriff’s Office
**Gang Surveillance**

**Area Served:** Rocky Mount and surrounding counties

**Implementing Agency:** Rocky Mount Police Department

**Director:** Sergeant Allen Moore, 252-972-1475

**Funding:** $22,718

**Overview**

The project funded the purchase of a pole camera surveillance system with night vision capabilities to allow indirect covert surveillance of gang activities that occur outside in urban areas. The system eliminates the need for direct observation and helps to ensure that officers are able to see natural behavior of gang members that do not realize they are being seen. An additional benefit is that activities will be recorded to make a more credible account of events for use in the investigation and prosecution of criminal gang activity. Once installed, maintenance cost for the system is not considerable; therefore the system will be sustainable in the future without additional grant assistance. The surveillance system is used in Rocky Mount and surrounding areas. This project closed August 2007.

Notebooks often reveal gang symbols
**Gang Reduction and Education**

**Area Served:** Edgecombe County  
**Implementing Agency:** Tarboro Police Department  
**Director:** Chief Robert Cherry, 252-641-4239  
**Funding:** $36,854

**Overview**

This project allows members of the Tarboro police department’s patrol division to work in conjunction with other county law enforcement agencies by creating a multijurisdictional gang task force. The task force is comprised of the Tarboro police department along with the Edgecombe County sheriff’s office and police departments of Rocky Mount, Pinetops, Whitakers, and Princeville. A gang prevention officer has aggressively set up training to educate the community, school faculty and uniform patrol officers on how to recognize the threat of gang activity.

**Objectives**

Gang activity reduction will be accomplished by:

- Continuing to identify gangs and gang members that operate in the community
- Educating the community and school faculty on gangs operating in the community
- Educating patrol officers in gang identification classes
- Using special operations, such as saturated patrols in gang infested areas, to interfere with gang activity
- Working closely with narcotic investigators to target gang members
involved in the sale and/or use of illegal narcotics

- Forming a gang task force

**Accomplishments**

- The project has identified local persons as gang members, validating them accordingly, and monitored their activities.

- A gang education, awareness and reduction officer has been established. Local supporting evidence of gang activity has been documented and shared with the public through awareness and education presentations to civic groups, businesses and all school administrators and faculty members.

- Departmental officers have been educated on gang activity, identifiers, and methods of suppression through training courses, conferences and local in-service training.

- Areas within the jurisdiction where gang activity is taking place have been identified through increased visibility, saturation patrols and implementation of graffiti removal ordinances.

- Pertinent information has been shared through communication with other agencies.

As a result of an increased police presence in potential problem areas, gang related activity has been kept on the misdemeanor level, as far as criminal activity is concerned, with no major gang related incidents having been documented to date. Funding has allowed the department to use greater proactive identification and suppression efforts that have proven effective in staying ahead of local gang activity within the jurisdiction.
“Without funding from the Governor’s Crime Commission our agency as well as many others across this great state would lag behind in the ever growing issues that we face today and in the future with gangs and gang related activity.”

- Chief Robert Cherry
  Tarboro Police Department

**Gang Violence Suppression Initiative**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Area Served:</th>
<th>Wayne County</th>
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<tr>
<td>Implementing Agency:</td>
<td>Wayne County Sheriff’s Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Director:</td>
<td>Sheriff Carey Winders, 919-222-7171</td>
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<tr>
<td>Funding:</td>
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**Overview**

This project enables local law enforcement to implement a collaborative strategy to suppress domestic terror and street gang violence. It focuses on educating the community, gathering intelligence, and suppressing illegal gang activity.

**Objectives**

The project will suppress gang violence by:

- Educating the community about gangs and domestic terror
- Gathering intelligence by validating gang members
- Developing a multi-agency task force for gang interdiction
- Educating local law enforcement officers in gang identification and
pertinent safety issues

- Creating a curriculum to instill discernment in youth when confronted by gangs
- Implementing a communication system for gang activity between agencies

Accomplishments

- The project has educated approximately 2,000 members of the community, including teachers and school staff, fire departments, civic groups, and community watches, about gangs and their activities.
- The Wayne County Sheriff’s Office has identified 16 gangs throughout the county and arrested roughly 30 gang members on drug or gun-related charges.
- A task force has yet to be developed. However, an open line of communication amongst agencies within Wayne County and surrounding counties exists.
- The entire detention staff for Wayne County, along with most of the Wayne County employees, has been trained on the identification and safety issues pertaining to gangs.
- A gang curriculum has been incorporated into the C.O.P.E. drug program that is taught in all Wayne County middle schools.
Gang One

Area Served: Wilson County
Implementing Agency: Wilson Police Department
Director: Lieutenant Mark Sullivan, 252-399-2319
Funding: $86,589

Overview
This project increases law enforcement awareness and intelligence of gang activity in the city of Wilson and Wilson County and will lead to reduced illegal gang activity through increased prevention, intervention and enforcement strategies.

Objectives
Using a proactive response to gang issues, the project aims to:

- Increase the identification and recording of gang members and associates
- Increase the number of community contacts being made through gang awareness presentations to civic groups, schools and the criminal justice community
- Increase the number of positive contacts with juveniles at risk of gang affiliation
- Establish a graffiti removal system, with the cooperation of other city departments and Y.O.U.T.H. of Wilson
- Increase the number of probation revocations based on violations imposed regarding gang affiliation
- Increase the number of arrests for acts of gang related vandalism
Accomplishments

- The Wilson police department identified and recorded 154 gang members and associates during 2007, compared to 51 in 2006. The department has set up a gang criminal history file to be maintained.

- The gang unit has conducted over 50 presentations, discussing gangs within the area. Two presentations consisted of more than 75 participants from the community. Eight school presentations have occurred, although classroom presentations will not begin until Spring 2008. All gang awareness brochures were printed in both English and Spanish as well.

- The gang unit has assisted with football camp and started a soccer camp for roughly 100 youth through help provided by the Wilson gang task force. In addition, 18 gang affiliated at-risk children participated in a recent Christmas outing in which they were taken to an arcade, movie and dinner.

- The Wilson police department juvenile/gang investigative unit and the Y.O.U.T.H. of Wilson removed graffiti by painting over it. In 2007, approximately 15 children helped paint over six locations. Part of the grant paid for the supplies used in graffiti removal. A database has been established to collect a wide variety of data related to gang activity including graffiti monitoring while a system for graffiti removal was established in spring 2007.

- A strong working relationship with the North Carolina Department of Community Corrections has led to countless examples of information on probationers with gang involvement. Thirty individuals were found to violate their probation in 2007.

- The unit investigated 32 gang related vandalism cases in 2007, leading to 14 arrests.
Policy Recommendations

The gang situation in North Carolina appears to be in the middle of the road or at a crossroads with a greater awareness and reporting on the part of law enforcement yet the majority of the state’s recognized gangs do not appear to be as problematic as gangs that have become institutionalized as found in Los Angeles, Chicago and other major cities across the country. Drug related offenses and vandalism continue to be the most commonly occurring offenses which are associated with the gangs identified in this study as well as those identified in the Analysis Center’s earlier research.

While national survey data indicate a leveling off in the number of gangs and gang members, data suggest that North Carolina may be lagging in this respect and has not experienced a plateau effect yet (NYGC, 2007). This produces a promising opportunity to address the gang issue cautiously without denial and without undue panic. Policy makers and criminal justice practitioners across the state should learn from and implement these successful strategies and avoid the pitfalls and failures that other jurisdictions have encountered in their past efforts to confront and mitigate gangs and gang activities. Based on this research, prior data and the existing gang literature the following policy recommendations are offered in an effort to help North Carolina’s communities address their respective gang issues in a balanced and more informed fashion.

Emphasize the necessity of strong community planning, collaboration and coordination

Community agencies must coordinate resources and actively plan for
addressing their unique gang issues. Planning should begin with a community threat assessment to ascertain the nature and extent of the gang presence, as well as the frequency and types of criminal behavior that are being attributed to gangs and gang members. Community advisory or oversight boards would be helpful in this regard with members being drawn from local law enforcement, juvenile crime prevention councils, local business members, social services and faith based groups. Indeed, the receipt of funding should be contingent on the development of advisory boards and the completion of a community level gang assessment.

**Gang programs should be comprehensive in scope and include suppression, prevention and intervention Components**

The literature and program evaluations clearly indicate the superior efficacy of comprehensive programs that target the most seriously violent and chronic offenders through suppression efforts coupled with prevention and intervention components aimed at fringe members and at-risk teens and young adults who are at an increased risk of joining gangs. The Spergel Model offers numerous effective practices for these types of comprehensive programs and practitioners should consult this work, as well as guides from the U.S. Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, when developing new programs and improving existing programs (Spergel, et.al, 1994; Howell, 2000).

**Funding for gang programs should be proactive and data driven**

In an effort to allocate funding which has the potential to exert the most impact and be more fiscally responsible all funding decisions should be derived from empirical data surrounding the gang presence in an area. Research at the local level documenting the nature and extent of gangs and gang activity should be required from all agencies or communities
that are seeking assistance. Funding should be considered for areas with newly emerging gang issues, as opposed to only and solely reactively funding those areas with an established or institutionalized gang presence, as intervention and prevention efforts can exert a significant impact on possibly curbing the growth of gangs and their resultant gang criminality.

**Improve both the quality and quantity of program data**

Despite the fact that many of the identified gang specific programs were relatively new, data collection for improving program operations and for justifying new and continuation funding should be significantly enhanced in terms of the type of data being collected. The lack of available programmatic data not only hampers agency effectiveness and efficiency but it can also preclude methodologically sound program evaluations. Many of the programs were only able to provide estimates on basic program operations and clientele.

While most programs either actually collect programmatic data, or have plans to do so, fewer programs collect, or plan to collect, evaluative data to track client progress both during program participation and after program completion. Consequently, funding agencies should consider requiring potential grantees to develop strong data collection and program evaluation components to enhance operations and improve the probability that these programs can document their success before local city councils and county commissions and obtain permanent funding. Indeed, less than one-half of the surveyed programs had either tried, or were planning to try, to gain line-item status. Steps should also be taken to monitor data for quality assurance and for its reliability and validity. As Decker, (2003) warns “we lack even basic knowledge about the impact of interventions on gangs and youths and this ignorance should be a clarion call to police, legislators, researchers, and policymakers.”
Utilize and incorporate effective practices and evidence based knowledge into program design

Funding considerations should be directed, indeed driven by, the inclusion of known or documented effective practices into program design. Potential grantees should be required to concentrate on what works when constructing new programs or when making improvements to existing programs. Despite the lack of a gold standard meta-analysis in this area, ample evidence exists which documents successful program components for planning, implementing and operating gang-related programs.

Expand and implement GangNet and explore funding for continual operations

The state’s new GangNet database should be supported in full as it will allow law enforcement agencies across the state to share vitally important data, thus serving as an invaluable tool for addressing and managing the gang issue in North Carolina. In addition, this database will assist in improving both the quantity and quality of available data and more importantly significantly enhance the reliability and validity of the data on the number of gangs and gang members. Consequently, this will facilitate better statistical reporting, research and program evaluation in the future.
Appendix
A. Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project

The Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project (GVRP) began in 1992 in Chicago with the vision of coordinating the criminal justice system with youth services and grassroots groups. In collaboration with researcher Irving Spergel, the program goal was developed to “reduce gang violence, especially gang homicide, and felony gang-motivated battery and assault in the target area” as well as target “at least 100 hardcore, violent or potentially violent gang youth” over a 12 month time period (Spergel et al. 2003a).

The program initially targeted an area of the city known for its Hispanic community and high gang-crime activity. A critical part of the program was street-level contacts with gang members. In fact, this type of interaction not only generated understanding and some support of the program amongst the targeted gang members, it even allowed for some gang members to become more involved as outreach workers to other youth. Based on journal reports listed in the study by Spergel and colleagues (2003a), the gang youth seemed generally receptive to conversation and even relayed personal concerns such as family disputes, worries about school and work, and recent gang activity in which they had participated. Street workers and outreach workers were not aids to making arrests; they were there to learn the concerns of the gang members, and assist in finding helpful programming.

Police involvement with the GVRP eventually involved two full-time officers who worked closely with the outreach workers to learn what the specific gang activity was and who the most problematic gang members were. Additional efforts to involve a dedicated probation officer in the program were not as fruitful as was originally planned. Community involvement with the project was made by the formation of a network of supportive groups and sites. Main contributors to the GVRP included local Boys & Girls Clubs, nearby city parks with approval from the Parks department, a few religious leaders who volunteered their time and
facilities, and a local job-placement agency. Within all the groups involved, individual leaders formed a committee to address problems in a more organized fashion between the groups. Also, research students at a local university assisted in evaluation efforts.

Results reported from the GVRP showed the effectiveness of various individual components (Spergel et al., 2003a). For community-related programs, job and counseling services were the most beneficial in reducing the likelihood of arrest for program participants. For drug arrests specifically, family services and counseling services were deemed the most effective in providing a better “success to failure ratio.” Educational services which dealt with school achievement or returning to school were the least effective in reducing arrests. In general, street-level program workers were more successful in reducing violent activity than drug-related activity for the gang youth. Incarceration rates did not seem to be affected by the program.

Spergel’s report (2003a) explains that even with the diversity of program options, the collaborative efforts that were obtained and the willingness of most involved groups to continue to project, the GVRP was discontinued after five years by the Chicago Police Department (CPD). A significant change in crime rates compared to other districts was not reported, even though it is impossible to predict how much more gang activity may have occurred without the GVRP. Community-level data showed that the GVRP was making good progress in reducing gang growth. However, the organizational and administrative problems that permeated the project and diminished progress finally brought it to a close. There were many problems associated with the intentions of the program and what the Superintendent of the CPD saw as appropriate. Thus the project was never fully implemented in accordance with the pre-planned program goals.

These results from Little Village give insight into which strategies should be incorporated into future efforts in order to create a program that is as
effective as possible. Any program involving law enforcement – especially the use of specific officers or gang units – must have full administrative support for it to avoid legislative set-backs. The team approach that was developed despite these set-backs was considered the most promising part of the GVRP. Street-level workers were needed to hear the concerns of gang members, community leaders were needed to provide services and support, and law enforcement was needed to ensure safety and target the most problematic offenders. The importance of street-level interaction with gang members can also be seen in the fieldwork of Fleisher (1998).

B. Weed & Seed

Weed & Seed began as a U.S. Department of Justice strategy to prevent crime in certain areas while instituting a safer community for the residents. The Weed & Seed strategy combines traditional law enforcement suppression tactics with community activism in neighborhood improvement. This creates a link between the residents and the police that will result in prolonged crime reduction. While Weed & Seed is not specific to gangs; multiple program sites had recognized gang problems.

The Weed & Seed approach consists of three components. “Weeding” is the law enforcement task to go into a targeted neighborhood and remove violent criminals and drug traffickers. “Seeding” is the community revitalization efforts to provide a safe neighborhood that deters future crime. The third component is community policing; which is used as a bridge to ease the transition between arresting the criminals and creating a safe community. Since funding three sites in 1991, Weed & Seed strategies are now being used in over 300 locations nation-wide, including fourteen sites in North Carolina (Weed & Seed Data Center, 2007).
A cross-site analysis of eight Weed & Seed programs was conducted by Dunworth, Mills, Cordner, and Greene (1999) for the National Institute of Justice. Of these eight cities across the country, six showed various levels of crime reduction. The following factors appeared to be the most influential in determining effective implementation. First are the preexisting features of the community infrastructure such as the crime level and economic growth. Also the program must be designed to include an early seeding operation with a sustained weeding operation to maintain the link between the community and the police. The program also relies on concentration of funding, and the initiative of community leaders to be supportive and give the program momentum. The program should not be broken up into phases where the weeding occurs, then the seeding; community policing must strive to keep these two processes working simultaneously.

Based on these qualifiers for success, the Weed & Seed strategy should not be applied in all situations. The best targets are smaller communities that have a pre-existing infrastructure to make the program favorable. This way, funding can be better concentrated in the area, and community leaders will have more resources with which to work. Due to the nationwide scope of the Weed & Seed strategy, it would be beneficial to briefly compare and contrast two successful program areas and two unsuccessful areas based on the research report (Dunworth et al., 1999).

The two program areas with the greatest level of crime reduction were the Pittsburgh, PA, Hills District and the Hartford, CT, Stowe Village. Weed & Seed began in Pittsburgh in 1992, targeting a one-half square mile area and 4,244 people. The Hills District had a lot of potential because it was located between the business district and the educational and culture district of Pittsburgh. However, its citizens were suffering from a close to 50 percent unemployment rate and the population was declining. The weeding operation focused on eliminating drug trafficking;
primary importance for the first two years of program implementation. The seeding part focused on the area’s economic potential by providing job training and better housing.

Funding for this area was an average of $554,167 annually per year for five years, with a large portion (35-40 percent) of the seeding budget eventually being given over to community authorities. Due to the initially heavy focus on the law enforcement weeding effort, residents’ expectations of the seeding effects were not being met. Therefore, the Pittsburgh program was restructured after these first couple years due to community complaints. This willingness to listen to the public and change the program to better suit their needs was important to their success.

Another factor that contributed to the success of this Weed & Seed operation was that the Hills District was already a valuable target for investors due to its location, thus the Weed & Seed program enhanced this appeal. Applying the Weed & Seed strategy to the Hills District helped to reverse an upward crime trend. Also, in the last year of the program, a local survey showed that 40 percent of respondents felt that the area had become a safer place to live.

Stowe Village, in Hartford, CT, was a geographically smaller program area covering one-tenth of a square mile with 1,300 residents. Weed & Seed operations began here in 1994 to assist the impoverished, multiracial community. The goals of this Weed & Seed program were to reduce violent crime and drug trafficking, as well as restore a sense of safety and community control to the residents.

Over the four years of this project, total funding averaged $612,106 per year. Although the amount of funding here was not the highest of the researched areas, part of the success of this project should be attributed to the fact that these funds were focused on a small area, similar to the Weed & Seed program in Pittsburgh’s Hills District. This allowed for a
variety of targeted programs rather than risk being spread too thin.

The weeding efforts in Stowe Village succeeded in arresting many drug dealers, though some trouble was had in getting convictions and lengthy sentencing. Seeding programs increased education and job-related skills and included the installation of a computer lab that gave residents better access to this information. Two years after implementation, the crime rate dropped even quicker, resulting in a 46 percent decrease in the crimes analyzed. Hartford also had the highest number of arrests over these two years, despite being the smallest evaluated program area.

Another program area, Meadows Village in Las Vegas, NV, showed no evidence of reduced crime, although local perceptions of the community did improve. Statistically similar to the Pittsburgh program, Meadows Village covered one-half of a square mile with 4,819 residents when the program started in 1994. This area consisted of mostly Spanish-speaking residents working low-skilled jobs. Problems in this area were youth gangs and drug-related crimes. The seeding efforts focused on improving education, health-care, and inter-community relationships.

Funding for Meadows Village was divided with another nearby program area – West Las Vegas – which was added after the first year. Funding for these areas averaged $722,689 annually per year for three years. Initially, the Weed & Seed program received negative publicity which undoubtedly reduced the effectiveness of the program. After two years, crime rate in Meadows Village increased nine percent. Despite this increase, 35 percent of survey respondents felt that the area was safer by the end of the program.

Providing important community services such as healthcare centers, better educational training, and family support services understandably made the public feel better about the area. However, this does not explain the increase in criminal activity. Meadows Village was already a high crime area so a 9 percent increase may be attributable to a natural
rise in criminal activity. However, not as much data was available for this area as it was for others, so there remains some speculation as to what may have caused the failure to reduce crime rate.

Firstly, the Meadows Village project not only received poor initial publicity, it also did not last as long as some of the other projects. This may be significant in that the Weed & Seed strategy was working, but simply suffered from a slow start and needed more time to develop. Also, having a multi-ethnic community innately causes difficulty with language barriers and community cohesiveness. Ideally, Weed & Seed would have continued in this area for a couple more years to better evaluate its impact given these start-up problems. One last potential contributor to its ineffectiveness against crime is that the Meadows Village project expanded outside its initially targeted area to include the West Las Vegas area. This caused a split in the funding, thus altering program dynamics.

Lastly, the Weed & Seed strategy also did not reduce crime rates in the Salt Lake City, UT, West Side. Some reasons for its lack of success are immediately obvious. The West Side project included three neighborhoods covering 6.3 square miles total, with 22,000 residents. Within the different neighborhoods, a variety of socio-economic living conditions existed. This disparity caused difficulty in creating programs that were culturally and socially relevant to the residents. The goals for this area were also rather generalized compared to other areas, such as “empower the community” to fund certain projects, and assisting with community mobilization efforts. Law enforcement goals were to reduce violent crime and drug crime, however the West Side area already had a relatively low crime rate compared to other areas.

Another problem for Weed & Seed in Salt Lake City was the relative lack of funding. Over the four years of the project, funding averaged $150,000 per year. After two years, the measured crime rate had increased 14 percent, and only 17 percent of respondents believed that the area had become a better place to live. Salt Lake City’s West Side
would have probably had better results if Weed & Seed was focused on one of the three neighborhood areas, giving it a smaller population and more consistent type of infrastructure to work with.

C. Anti-Gang Initiatives

The Dallas police department began a one-year program known as the Dallas Anti-Gang Initiative targeting five particularly gang-heavy areas in the city. To carry the program out, teams of six to eight police officers were freed from regular service calls to work specifically on this project. The vast majority of time and funding was spent on these three gang suppression actions: officers aggressively enforced curfew whenever gang members were encountered, officers worked closely with schools to enforce truancy laws, and officers patrolled with high visibility, making frequent stops to check suspicious people. Dallas was one of 15 cities to receive federal funding for this anti-gang initiative. Research by Fritsch, Caeti, and Taylor (1999) shows that Dallas had 79 gangs and 6,145 documented gang members at the outset of this program. By the end of the one year period, comparing the five program areas with four similar control areas showed a significant decrease in gang-related violence. Overall, gang-related violence dropped by 57 percent in the program areas; a significant difference from the 37 percent decrease in the control areas. Also during the year of the Dallas program, homicides that involved juvenile victims fell from 18 the previous year to six, while gang-related juvenile homicides fell from six to two.

These remarkable results are not without question. Only three of the five program areas experienced reductions in gang violence compared to two of the four control areas. Also, given the subjectivity of gang violence, a program length of only one year, and an increase in other types of crime such as robberies, the results are too ambiguous to attribute any positive change strictly to the Dallas initiative. Greene and Pranis (2007) state
that, “the Dallas Anti-Gang Initiative was, at best, a distraction from the real problem and, at worst, a counterproductive exercise that increased violent crime levels.”

The inclusion of truancy and curfew enforcement was an important part of giving the patrols more potential for effectiveness. Past research has shown that saturation patrol alone does not have a prolonged effect on crime, and crackdowns must be applied repeatedly, thus losing their efficiency (Sherman, 1990). Therefore some combination of tactics could provide greater value within these suppression strategies. However, the combination of tactics in Dallas – more active and visible patrol, combined with truancy enforcement (with the help of schools) and curfew enforcement – proved to be more effective. Other program areas include St. Louis, where the program was a noticeable failure, and Detroit, where the results were also contested.

The St. Louis program created no significant change in the targeted areas. This program failed to combine the suppression act of patrol with the prevention act of curfew or truancy enforcement (Decker, Curry, Catalano, Watkins, Green, 2005). Law enforcement officers did not consider curfew enforcement to be “real” police work, as well as some being unable to even identify the targeted neighborhoods (Greene & Pranis, 2007). The St. Louis Anti-Gang Initiative failed due to not adhering to the program model and taking all parts of the program seriously.

In Detroit, Bynum and Varano (2003) found that the Anti-Gang Initiative reduced gun-related crime in one precinct by 112 crimes per month, citing the program as largely successful. The only problems that Bynum and Varano point out with this program were administrative difficulties, failure to get proper equipment and restrictive patrol areas. However, Greene and Pranis (2007) reveal several other problems that question the program results. Due to a spike in the crime rate before program implementation, the Detroit program was basing its results off an
unnaturally high level of crime. Also, post-testing was not done immediately after the program ended.

The anti-gang initiatives give little guarantee for future success. The reviewed programs either noticeably failed or had questionable data. It is possible that the program, while seeking to combine suppression and prevention activities, used the wrong types of activities. That is, while saturation patrol alone does not appear to reduce crime, neither does implementation of curfew ordinances.

D. Operation Night Light

In response to rising juvenile homicide in the early 1990s, Boston’s law enforcement gang unit and probation officers formed a partnership to create Operation Night Light. Homicide and aggravated assault peaked in 1990, and increasing gang disputes on the street were spilling over into the courtrooms (Karp & Clear 2002). Working off the concept of “you can’t fight fires from the station house,” probations officers would join the gang unit to create groups that went out on the streets and made casual contacts with the gang members who were on probation (2002). Also, they would make rounds at night for scheduled curfew checks and to speak with parents about their child’s behavior.

Results from this program, while hard to measure due to its nature of being social, appear positive. While this was not the only anti-gang program present in Boston during the 1990s (e.g. Operation Ceasefire), the number of homicides declined, and juvenile homicide was especially low. Operation Night Light began in late 1992. In 1993 there were 16 juvenile homicides, declining to six, four and one each successive year. For the years 1996 through 1998, only one juvenile homicide was reported each year. However, these last few years of data coincide with Operation Ceasefire which may have also contributed to the declining homicide rate.
Operation Night Light did succeed in giving more meaning to probationary sentences and curfew, as well as the importance of curfew enforcement. One Boston police detective said, “I've seen gangs decimated from a particular neighborhood only because of supervised curfews and area restrictions” (Karp & Clear 2002). It is believed that residents’ feeling of safety is generally increased by knowing that probation officers are actually present during these later hours to actively ensure that the rules are being followed. Also, the frequent face-to-face contact that officers had with those youth on probation, instilled in them a more genuine feeling of being supervised which contributed to their adherence to the program, as well as encouraged future youth to adhere (2002).

Other factors that contributed to the community-wide success during this time were the expansion of a summer job program which gave part-time employment to youth who successfully completed the program, and a coalition of clergy members who were able to get some gang youth involved in church-based programs.

E. ACT Now

The ACT Now program began in 1994 to address the truancy problem in Pima County, AZ. This was a densely populated county including the city of Tucson, which accounted for more than half of Arizona’s chronic truancies in the years before the program (Baker et al., 2001). This program was primarily run by the Pima County Attorney’s Office (PCAO), which recognized truancy as a major problem and recommended the program as an intervention tactic. The PCAO partnered closely with the school system and created a Center for Juvenile Alternatives (CJA) to assist students and parents in realizing the dangers of truancy and to get parents more involved in their child’s activities.

Having established this organizational framework, the program consisted of the following steps. After the first unexcused absence, a letter is sent
to the parents by the school advising them of the ACT Now program and the consequences of truancy. After three such absences, information is sent to the CJA which notifies the parents that they may be subject to legal action. Parents may then contact the CJA to get involved in community programs including counseling, support groups and parenting classes. Completion of these classes results in dismissal of the case.

Research by Baker, Sigmon, and Nugent (2001) show that after three years, the ACT Now program greatly increased awareness of truancy, as well as reducing the truancy problem. In the first program year (1994-95), 46 truancy cases were reported; two years later, 332 cases were reported. Also, the largest school district involved in the program experienced a 64 percent decrease in truancies during the last two program years, as well as decreased drop-out rates. While not specifically addressing any criminal data, the ACT Now program does provide an answer to juvenile truancy, which would likely coincide with a reduction in juvenile crime, at least during the day. Also, it can assist in providing a more thorough database for use by law enforcement.

**F. Truancy Reduction Demonstration Program (TDRP)**

Similar to the ACT Now program, though less structured, is the Truancy Reduction Demonstration Program (TDRP). This program has been part of larger Weed & Seed operations across the nation. Implemented slightly differently in each case, the TDRP includes certain core components: parental involvement, meaningful consequences for truancy and incentives for school attendance, and the use of community resources such as multi-agency collaboration. The TDRP is not so much a program in and of itself but, similar to Weed & Seed, it is more of a guideline for success.

The overall assessment of the TDRP showed several key factors to truancy reduction. First, the most important partnerships are those with
organizations such as law enforcement, juvenile justice agencies, and social services. Second, it is crucial for data collection to be consistent in different program sites to allow for accurate tracking and comparisons. Third, to increase family involvement in addressing the problem, groups should use culturally appropriate materials and practices (Baker et al. 2001). These results, while truancy specific in research, should apply to any program. Their inclusion in Weed & Seed is simply an additional tool for creating a comprehensive community approach to crime and gang problems. Also, these factors help reinforce the data of what makes a successful program: multi-agency collaboration, consistent data collection, and materials that are specifically tailored to the target audience.

G. Youth Firearms Violence Initiative

In 1995, a time when juvenile violence was rising and handguns were the weapon of choice, the Youth Firearms Violence Initiative (YFVI) was launched for 10 cities. These ten targeted cities were federally funded with up to $1 million dollars total for the four year program. With a focus on Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), the YFVI planned to develop and enhance programs to decrease the number of violent, gang-related, and drug-related crimes involving the use of firearms. The local COPS were encouraged to develop programs that focused on three areas: streets, communities and schools. This included the development of educational prevention and intervention programs about handguns, community based programs to reduce handgun violence, and family assistance programs. The details of these individual programs were largely decided by the local COPS. This caused each program to differ significantly in how it went about enacting the YFVI.

In evaluating the five intensive sites (those with more thorough evaluations of program impact and process), Dunworth (2000) found that
the YFVI can be successful depending on thoroughness of implementation and consistency of focus. All the intensive YFVI sites had some percentage decrease in gun crimes and youth involvement in gun crimes. However, any direct correlation between the YFVI and the decrease in crime should not be scrutinized. Based on FBI reports, nationwide weapon use was already declining in the two years prior to this program, and it continued to decline. Therefore, part of the results may be due to the natural decrease in criminal activity during this time. Given the broadness of the various YFVI implementations, new programs may be structured similarly to take advantage of the most effective parts the YFVI from various cities.

Given the range of tactics employed throughout the different program sites, a summation of certain effective and ineffective strategies would better assist in any future implementation of similar initiatives. City-wide enforcement strategies yielded the highest number of arrests, as opposed to focusing on smaller areas. These arrest numbers were influenced by whether or not the officers had been freed from other calls to focus on this program, or if they had to continue in regular duties. It is possible that some of the smaller geographic areas that used specialized officers in their YFVI strategy reduced the likelihood of gun carry due to the fact that those officers were present and involved in the community.

Although each city used their funds to create a distinguishable gang unit, these units varied greatly; from a specialized unit freed from regular service calls, to a group that consisted of regular officers on rotating assignment. This creation of specialized units for the YFVI program was beneficial in successfully carrying out program goals such as creating police presence, and in not conflicting with communication efforts between the regular police officers.

The most productive method for gun seizure was executing search warrants. In the Salinas initiative, the search warrant tactic was 4.5 times more effective than the other seven tactics they measured in
Salinas. Also, proactive arrests for gun-related offenses were seen as valuable in reducing subsequent gun-related crime. Most importantly, program goals need to be developed locally and not rely on federal solutions that may not be applicable.

**H. Pulling America’s Communities Together (PACT)**

In response to the problems of juvenile gun violence in Atlanta, GA, a project was developed known as Pulling America’s Communities Together (PACT). The PACT project sought to preemptively intervene in the chain of events that lead to gun violence by juveniles. The report by Kellerman, Fuqua-Whitley, and Parramore (2006), explains that the program plan included tracking the geographic and temporal patterns in juvenile gun violence, determining where and why juveniles acquire guns, then developing an intervention program to be applied and monitored in a designated area of Atlanta. The developed program would be applied and then evaluated by researchers, who would recommend any immediate changes necessary depending on program effectiveness. Thus the program was not developed in one stage, applied in the next, and evaluated in the third. The program took on a cyclical nature to adapt to the targeted area. The PACT program was finalized to involve the following:

- Education and outreach initiatives with help from the community and local media; however this part did not have much significance due to lack of involvement by the media and community groups.

- Directed patrols via a special crime unit for gun-related crime and violence; however this task force had difficulty meeting demands due to having a dual responsibility with responding to city-wide firearm assaults.
Collaboration with federal prosecutors resulted in the FACE-5 program. Standing for Firearms in Atlanta Can Equal 5 years in prison, only the most heinous of adult gun offenders were put into this program.

Assisting with this effort to reduce gun supply, tracking gun use was essential in determining the initial purchaser of illegally owned firearms. Through ballistics tests and the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN), law enforcement and federal prosecutors could target the most severe adult suppliers of juvenile firearms. In one case, it was found that fifteen different guns, all taken from juvenile offenders, came from one individual.

The rehabilitation of juvenile offenders was planned with help from the juvenile justice system, however this effort was unable to take shape due to the system having other demands.

Between 1995 and 2000, the six years the program was implemented, homicides in Atlanta fell 27 percent, with the numbers from 2000 being the lowest recorded homicide rate in 30 years. However, the researchers conclude that this declining homicide rate could not be attributed to Atlanta’s PACT program. This is due to there being an already decreasing crime trend in the area two years prior to the program; the fact that the program failed to implement many of its initial strategies, and similar decline in homicides state-wide.

Lessons learned from this program were that, in addition to the inherent difficulties in creating agency partnerships, it was learned that “conceptual consensus about a problem does not guarantee a consensus about solving it.” That is, even though everyone agreed to the juvenile gun problem, there was little agreement on how to solve it and how much different organizations should become involved. Also, some
agencies were unwilling to help outside of their own jurisdictions.

The PACT program had a good comprehensive plan and may work if all the factors were able to be implemented. As seen in the Youth Firearms Violence Initiatives, if a specialized law enforcement unit is created specifically for program goals, it can be much more efficient and effective in targeting the problem. Also, lack of community involvement caused residents to know very little about the program. By the end of the PACT program, it had essentially become a suppression-only program that failed to significantly impact juvenile gun violence.

I. Partnership for the Prevention of Juvenile Gun Violence & Operation Eiger

In 1997, Baton Rouge, LA, sponsored by the OJJDP, began their Partnership for the Prevention of Juvenile Gun Violence. In the years before this Partnership began, 90 percent of all juvenile homicides involved the use of a gun, with most of this being located in specific hot spots (Lizotte & Sheppard, 2001). The Baton Rouge Partnership targeted two specific zip code areas known for their high levels of crime. Multiple smaller programs were included under the Partnership, though Operation Eiger was one of the most extensive. Working from an intervention strategy, this program involved the most violent and chronic juvenile offenders ages 17-21 (called Eigers) in the following three-pronged approach (2001):

- Intervention services, especially the faith-based Lifeskills Academy, which gives Eigers and family access to speakers, mentors, tutors, as well as social services and recreational programs.
- Strengthen family support by providing family counseling and other preventative services coordinated by the Partnership.
• Strengthen the community by addressing neighborhood deterioration and economic deprivation.

These three categories include many different programs and partnerships, often with a certain degree of accountability for the Eigers or their parents. Some of these include: family education services require once-a-week contacts with the parents, I-CARE is a program to allow access to school-based programs for younger siblings of Eigers, the juvenile diversion program partners with Boy Scouts of America to provide an alternative to first-time incarceration, and a comprehensive directory of contact information for all involved organizations is given to Eiger families (OJJDP, 1999).

Other programs that were carried out simultaneously with Operation Eiger included suppression of street-level drug-sales, gun tracing, and other case management services for mentoring, job-training, school services, and others. The gun tracing data revealed that over half of the guns seized originally came from within the target area (OJJDP, 1999). It also helped to identify new offenders, both juvenile and adult.

Results from the Baton Rouge programs show significant reductions in crime, but these results cannot be attributed to any one part or program within the Partnership, rather the collaboration within the program as a whole caused its effectiveness. From 1996 to 1997, homicide dropped 17 percent, aggravated assaults dropped 43 percent, and 30 percent less youth involvement in firearm-related assaults (1999). These results suggest that Baton Rouge’s over all implementation of the Partnership for the Prevention of Juvenile Gun Violence was successful.

Baton Rouge had the benefit of a very supportive community, which undoubtedly helped the program gain momentum. It emphasized a comprehensive approach that was able to gain the support of many unique groups. The resource directory that developed over the course of these programs included “1,578 businesses, 183 churches, 67 schools,
family service agencies in 69 categories, health services groups in 74 categories, and more than 400 other programs and services” (OJJDP, 1999).

This overwhelming number of supportive agencies seemingly can’t help but create a reduction in crime rate, and subsequently gang activity. Also, it is possible that many of the intervention and prevention services, being combined efforts with pre-existing groups, helps the youth feel more like a part of the community and less like a labeled delinquent in a special program. Operation Eiger, while practically impossible to replicate in detail, is a clear lesson in the benefits of an approach that has coordination and cooperation on a large scale, while maintaining control of the program logistics.

J. Boston Gun Project (Operation Ceasefire)
The Boston Gun Project (which later developed into Operation Ceasefire) began implementation in 1996. Its goal was to reduce youth firearm violence, which was primarily gang-related. The program was developed to focus on direct intervention with gang members with punishment for noncompliance being “a promise, not a deal” (Kennedy, Braga, Piehl, 2001). The Working Group for this project had several specific goals for the problem-oriented policing program (2001):

- Have authorities focus on both intra-state and inter-state firearms trafficking.
- Focus enforcement attention on traffickers of the gun makes and calibers most used by gang members.
- An in-house tracking system and focused enforcement for traffickers of guns with short time-to-crime intervals.8
- Enforcement attention on gun traffickers for the most violent gangs.
- Attempted restoration of destroyed serial numbers.
- Tracing of gun crimes and developing leads from arrestees.

In addition to these program goals, a “pulling levers” deterrent strategy was used which included efforts to reach out directly to targeted gang members, explicit messages that violence would not be tolerated, and using every legal action available (pulling levers) to back up this message.

One particular program component that helped to visualize the problem was a mapping of people ages 21 and under who had been killed by a gun or knife between 1990 and 1994. This map, supplemented with background data of the victims including criminal history, allowed researchers and law enforcement personnel to see where exactly the problems occurred. This map overlapped very closely with a map of known gang turf, as well as a chart of known gang rivalries. This sort of pre-program research was critical in allowing for law enforcement to have the proper focus.

Operation Ceasefire was heavily involved in direct contact with gang members through street workers and multi-agency support. The goals of the program were carried out via the following four-level intervention model, as described by Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl (2001). Level one was a warning to specific groups to stop violent activity. This could be given in forums, from street workers, or through other means. This was the most common level of intervention. Level two was mostly suppression by law enforcement.

These activities included increased police presence, serving warrants, etc. If these did not work, then level three was a heavily coordinated effort between multiple agencies. Suppressive tactics were strengthened, and gang leaders were brought in to be talked to in a forum format. The forums consisted of explanations of the agencies involved (including federal prosecution), giving examples of named gang
members who had been arrested (including criminal history, arrest charges, and sentence being served) and examples of the pulling levers strategy. Lastly, level four was in effect a dismantling of the gang through undercover operations and federal sanctions.

The results of Operation Ceasefire reported success in reducing not only youth gun violence, but also police calls for shots fired and gun-related offenses for all ages. Based on averages from the months following Ceasefire intervention, researchers Braga, Kennedy, Piehl, and Waring (2001) report the following results for Boston: a 63 percent decrease in monthly youth homicide, a 32 percent decrease in monthly shots-fired calls, a 25 percent decrease in all gun-assault incidents city-wide, and in one district, a 44 percent decrease in youth gun assaults. Also, research by Karp and Clear (2002) on Operation Night Light in Boston includes that only one juvenile homicide occurred per year from 1996 to 1998, and over all homicide reports declined from sixty-one in 1996 to thirty-four in 1998.

Operation Ceasefire was tailored specifically for Boston, in that it used the resources and connections available within the city. However, many aspects of the program may be transferable to future programs. These include the deterrent effect of the pulling levers strategy, which was central to the operation, and the types of quantitative and qualitative data collection in the pre-program period. Due to there being more than one program active at this time that affected the results (Operation’s Ceasefire and Night Light), use of either one of these programs should be frequently monitored to ensure its effectiveness and the possible need to include aspects of both programs.

K. Operation Cul-de-Sac

Working off the theory of situational crime prevention, and partly influenced by Oscar Newman’s work on “defensible space” (Newman,
1972), Operation Cul-de-Sac (OCDS) used a very simple tactic – traffic barriers. Situational crime prevention theory is premised on the belief that crime is an act of opportunity; therefore by preventing opportunities for crime, potential criminals will go elsewhere. In the early 1990s, Los Angeles, California was experiencing a rise in drive-by homicide and other street assaults. After analyzing the “hot spots” for this activity, police blocked off access to these neighborhoods from the major thoroughfares by placing concrete barriers - and later iron fences - across certain roads. This effectively produced cul-de-sacs within the neighborhood, allowing a single entry/exit point for certain areas. Since cul-de-sacs limit through traffic from the area, hopefully any future hit-and-run shootings would be deterred.

After implementation of these cul-de-sacs, a significant reduction in both homicide and assault occurred during the two-year program in 1990 and 1991. Research by James Lasley (1998) shows that in the year before beginning OCDS, seven homicides were reported in the program area. However, during the two-years of the program, only one homicide was reported. This can be attributed to the inability of criminals to quickly get out of the neighborhood in vehicles, as well as the increased awareness of residents as to who is entering or exiting the area. After the program’s completion, crime levels went back up - nine homicides were reported in the area in 1992. For the control group area, there was no significant reduction in crime level. Comparing assault crimes, the program area assaults fell 17 percent the first year, and another 15 percent the second year, while rising 26 percent the year after program completion. Assaults in the control area rose slightly during the program years, perhaps due to criminal displacement. While effective in reducing homicide and assault in the area, other crimes such as property or violent crime did not seem to be affected by the traffic barriers.

The lessons learned that made OCDS successful are to not merely analyze hot spots to try and suppress crime, but to prevent the
opportunity for the crime to occur in the first place. This can mean creating little opportunity to stop and park vehicles for prolonged periods of time, and especially increasing the visibility of these areas. In doing so, any suspicious activity will be more noticeable. The OCDS strategy has not been researched elsewhere, but shows positive results and is based off sound theory. For future implementation, plans should be made to adjust for the potential of displaced criminal activity, as well as how certain criminals may change tactics to try and work around any barriers. In addition to any criminological concerns over implementing OCDS, it is a task that requires support from the Department of Transportation.

L. Operation Hammer

Operation Hammer was a strong-arm police attack to supposedly clean up Los Angeles of gang members via massive arrests. This operation occurred in 1988 and lasted for one weekend, complete with pre-planned media coverage and special booking stations for arrestees. The results were an impressive 1,453 arrests, and an equally impressive 1,350 being released without charges (Klein, 1995). Despite this efficiency of a mere 7 percent, the operation was repeated multiple times in smaller waves.

One of Operation Hammer’s problems was that it undermined the necessities of punishment – that it is swift, certain, and severe. There was little certainty that any of those arrested could be held, and given the high release rate its severity was practically non-existent. Operation Hammer only attempts, unsuccessfully, to suppress gang activity without giving a more socially acceptable alternative with which to engage gang members. As a result, most gang members will simply laugh off the incident and strengthen their resolve for the gang (Klein, 1995). At the very least, programs which focus on high arrests should be combined
with an intervention program for the arrested youth.

M. Operation Hardcore

Operation Hardcore was begun in the early 1980s in Los Angeles as part of a greater “L.A. Plan” to suppress gang activity. Operation Hardcore involved the development of a special prosecutorial unit to be dedicated to convicting gang leaders and other serious gang members. Due to resources, this unit eventually focused primarily on homicide cases. The following components are used in the program: one deputy taking the case from start to finish, no plea bargains, witness protection, and special search warrants and training.

The initial results of Operation Hardcore proved very favorable, having a conviction rate of 95 percent (Dahmann, 1983). However, after conviction, the operation is done. It is assumed that the gang member has been deterred, in spite of the possibility that he or she may undermine the effects of the program by getting involved in prison gangs or falling into a cycle of recidivism. Individual conviction of a few offenders often has no clear effect on the actions of the gang as a whole, thus getting a conviction alone is often not enough to make a significant impact on gang activity.

By focusing on one particular method of suppression, Operation Hardcore holds certain gang members back for a time, but there are too many other gang members that will step up in place of those arrested. If properly combined with alternatives to incarceration that consisted of gang intervention programs, then Operation Hardcore’s high conviction rate may be more valuable in that it would put more serious gang members into relevant youth programs.

N. Jurisdictions Unified for Drug Gang Enforcement (JUDGE)

Through 1988 and 1989, San Diego CA carried out the Jurisdictions
Unified for Drug Gang Enforcement (JUDGE) program. This program was developed in response to the probation department’s resources being stretched to the point where too many gang members had to be released. The JUDGE program targeted juvenile and adult gang members who were on probation for narcotics violations or not yet on probation but involved in illegal drug activity. Through the cooperation of prosecutors, probation officers, and law enforcement, the JUDGE program had two goals: to provide consequences for probation violations and new offenses committed by targeted offenders, and to reduce criminal activity and drug use among the target population (Pennell, Melton, Hoctor, 1996). Vertical prosecution was used to decrease the wait time between arrest and court, allowing more cases to be handled.

Researchers Pennell, Melton, and Hoctor (1996) provide the following information on the JUDGE program. In the two years of the program, JUDGE targeted 279 offenders, with over half being 16-17 years old, and almost all being either Black or Hispanic. Follow-up studies between 1992 and 1995 showed that JUDGE was effective in targeting individuals who remain criminally active. In these follow-up years: 64 percent of the targeted offenders had an average of three court cases filed each; 23 percent were in state prison; and 5 percent were in local custody. The JUDGE program used the following criteria in its accurate targeting of gang members; gangs were defined by four characteristics:

- The group has a name or identifiable leadership.
- The members claim a territory, turf, neighborhood, or criminal enterprise.
- The members associate on a continuous or regular basis.
- The members engage in delinquent or criminal behavior.

Documented gang members met at least one of the following criteria:

- The individual admits gang membership.
• The individual has tattoos, wears or possesses clothing and/or paraphernalia that is primarily associated with a specific gang.

• The individual is observed participating in delinquent or criminal activity with known gang members.

• Police records and/or observations show the individual’s close association with known gang members.

• Information from a reliable informant identifies the individual as a gang member.

In addition to these guidelines, by working with probation officers to focus on juvenile gang members who were on probation for drug-related offenses, JUDGE was able to successfully identify youth that later showed a strong criminal history. While JUDGE was a suppression program to put offenders behind bars, it would be best combined with some form of intervention to reduce the likelihood of further offenses by the targeted youth. This creation of a more comprehensive approach could lessen the overcrowding of prisons and detention centers, giving incentive for community involvement to help at-risk youth. Programs such as Lifeskills’95 could work well in conjunction with the targeting methods used by JUDGE.

O. Tri-Agency Resource Gang Enforcement Team (TARGET)

The Tri-Agency Resource Gang Enforcement Team (TARGET) is a cooperative effort between police departments, probation officers, and district attorney’s offices. First implemented in 1992 in Orange County, California, the primary goal of the TARGET program is to prevent gang activity by selectively incarcerating repeat offenders who are gang members for all possible offenses (similar to the pulling levers strategy of Operation Ceasefire). To carry out this program, a few police specialists, as well as a probation officer and district attorney work as an identified
team to gather and share information about gang members and prepare criminal reports. This team not only works to selectively incarcerate the most violent gang members, they also enforce probation and make arrests in areas of high gang activity. There has been criticism regarding the fairness of selective incarceration and incapacitation theory (Males, Macallair, Corcoran, 2006; Gottfredson, 1999), yet there is a cohort of juveniles who tend to commit a disproportionate amount of crime.

A study of the TARGET program shows a successful reduction in gang crime by 11 percent its first year, with a cumulative reduction of 64 percent in 1993, dropping to 59 percent in 1994 (Kent et al., 2000). Also, other TARGET operations have been credited with “dismantling” certain gangs by incarcerating the recognized gang leaders and placing other gang members on probation (Howell, 2000). Limitations of this study include its use of only one measure of gang crime, and its failure to specify the effectiveness of the individual components. That is, whether the cooperation between agencies worked best, or the focus on repeat offenders, etc.

Any future use of this program should include a multi-part definition and measure of gang crime, as well as the ability to validate its individual components through regular reports or other means. Even with these limitations, TARGET was awarded in 1993 with a National League of Cities award for Exemplary Local Government Criminal Justice Programs. The TARGET program shows that selective incarceration can successfully reduce gang crime if done correctly (such as use of the pulling levers strategy) and supported through multiple agencies, however future use of the program with more well-defined measures is needed.

**P. LifeSkills’95**

The Lifeskills’95 program was a one year study that consisted of a thirteen week program and follow-up reports for the remainder of the year. The program itself is a parole re-entry program in California that
targets juvenile offenders; it assists in the initial reintegration efforts of juveniles into society. The Lifeskills program is structured as such because it is often the experiences of these first few weeks that decide whether or not a released juvenile offender will successfully adjust to societal norms or revert to a criminal lifestyle. The program consists of thirteen consecutive weekly meetings, with each meeting being a 1.5 hour topical lecture, followed by a 1.5 hour group discussion. Also, a major part of the program is individual group counseling on any number of subjects including drug use, family stress, or fear of failure.

The Lifeskills’95 program appeared to be successful in assisting with averting juveniles from returning to a criminal lifestyle. The participants in the program reported significantly better results than the control group in nearly all areas: less gang affiliation, better personal relationships, stable employment, less parole failure, and fewer arrests after one year. More than two-thirds of participants had no gang affiliation and no arrests after one year, compared to less than half of the control group (Josi & Sechrest, 1999).

This program attributes most of its success to the following factors: a positive atmosphere; individualized counseling, and a strong focus on job training (1999). This assistance is necessary to help youth overcome stresses of poverty, limited opportunity, and ethnic or cultural tension. If young people can stay motivated and gain stable employment, then there is less allure of joining a gang or committing crimes. While this program produced optimistic results, there has been no research on its application outside of San Bernardino, California. It does, however, stress the importance of intervening in juveniles’ lives immediately after release from detention centers.

**Q. Community Justice Boards**

Community justice is the concept of getting the community more actively involved in the criminal justice process. Specifically, this model takes
those who were affected by a criminal event (victims, families, neighbors, etc.) and involves them in the sentencing process; both in terms of what an offender’s probation should consist of, as well as these people being personally involved in various community programs to help in integrative efforts. Originally, this concept grew out of the Oxnard California area, and has spread to several other cities across the nation (Karp & Clear, 2002). Researchers Karp and Clear have followed this type of alternative sanctioning in a number of reports.

One model of community justice comes from the Vermont Community Reparative Boards. The creation of these boards was formed based on survey results which showed that 95 percent of Vermont citizens favored restitution and community service for non-violent offenders, as well as general consensus about the types of services that should be offered (Karp & Clear 2002). This Board is not set up to conflict with court sentences, rather the judge makes a decision to send an offender before the Board based on the offense and offender history. Having sent an offender before the Board, the Board’s consensus is final. While individual Boards vary based on locality, there are five general goals to be met in sentencing (2002):

1. Victims and affected parties describe the impact of the offender’s behavior.
2. Offenders make amends to victims and affected parties.
3. Offenders make amends to the community.
4. Offenders demonstrate healthy behaviors and learn ways to avoid re-offending.
5. The community offers reintegration.

Actions during the hearing include establishing common ground with the offender, the affirmation of social norms, and the admission of guilt and necessity of consequences (2002). The central part of this structure is
the Board members' negotiation in agreeing on how best to meet the first four goals for each individual offender.

This new approach to sentencing has yet to create enough data and quantifiable results. However, community justice is a strategy that is generally favored by the communities in which it is being used, and can assist in lessening the consumption of resources in prisons and of probation officers which are already stretched thin. Involvement of local residents, including the victims, is also better from a social standpoint for reintegration into the society. As Petersilia (2003) mentions,

Crime victims have a vital role to play in managing the offender’s return from prison. They should be consulted not only about the inmate’s suitability for parole but also asked for input regarding the conditions of release...Involving victims more integrally in prisoner re-entry processes and programs is critical.

While most of the crimes that the Vermont Board dealt with were alcohol-related, this sort of community sanctioning could be beneficial for curbing gang activity among youth. By getting the community involved, victims, parents, neighbors and friends could all speak with the youth about his or her delinquency and the dangers of gangs. Offenses such as theft, vandalism, and possible drug-use or minor assaults could be handled by a community justice board. This would show concern and the willingness of people to help at-risk youth face-to-face, and on-going support through assistance with local programs in which youth are involved.

**R. Boys & Girls Clubs**

The Boys & Girls Club of America (BGCA) is a national foundation that includes a multitude of programs. While not always gang-specific, local Clubs try and appeal to youth who lack supervision or are seen as “at-risk” for other reasons. Programs can be educational, career-related, athletic, and many others including gang-prevention. The BCGA works off
the basis that,

In every community, boys and girls are left to find their own recreation and companionship in the streets. An increasing number of children are at home with no adult care or supervision. Young people need to know that someone cares about them (BCGA Homepage, 2007).

These Clubs exist throughout the country and succeed in giving many youths a place in which to get involved and people to positively interact with. In 2002, researchers Arbreton and McClanahan published a study specifically addressing the gang intervention and prevention programs used within the BGCA. These gang-related programs began in the 1990s to help respond to the growth of gang activity. Involving both prevention and intervention efforts, Clubs implemented these programs in slightly different ways depending on local resources; but always within the confines of the BGCA model: community mobilization, recruitment of at-risk youth, programming developed specifically for youth, and individualized case management.

Results from twenty-four individual Clubs show that the prevention and intervention programs were successful in obtaining a significant number of participants (2002); averaging forty-four youth in prevention programs and thirty-four youth in intervention programs. Second, having gotten the youth into the programs, 73 percent of prevention participants and 68 percent of intervention participants still attended the Clubs regularly after twelve months. Third, almost all the youth said that they received support and guidance from administrators. The Clubs were also seen as safe places to be and, for the most part, youth had a sense of belonging with their local Club. Although no conclusive statement could be made that Boys & Girls Clubs prevented future gang involvement, the Clubs are generally correlated with less delinquent and gang-related behaviors.

The opportunity for teenagers and even younger children to get involved
with programs providing mentoring support and leadership, safe and positive atmospheres, and recreational peer-building activity should, by all accounts, prevent youth from feeling the need to join gangs. One problem with such group-structured activity which should be closely monitored is the potential for group activity to increase the cohesion of gang members who may be participating in the activities together. Boys & Girls Clubs appeal to youth for being a place to get together and have fun with little financial expense; however gang-prevention will be undermined if multiple gang youth use the Clubs as a “hang-out” to associate with fellow gang members.

**S. Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT)**

Gang Resistance Education And Training (GREAT) is a middle-school youth program, similar in structure to D.A.R.E., and also used in all fifty states. GREAT has been in effect for more than fifteen years. It generally consists of a nine-hour curriculum taught by police officers with three set goals: reducing gang involvement, teaching the consequences of gang involvement, and creating positive interaction with law enforcement. While the latter two of these goals are generally met, the GREAT program is not seen as significant in reducing gang membership.

Summarizing two studies in the 1990s, Esbensen (2004) cites that GREAT shows no significant longitudinal effects on preventing gang membership. There are a number of factors working against GREAT to reduce gang membership. It is predominantly a short-term educational program and thus lacks the involvement other programs deem necessary to keep youth out of gangs. With a primary target of all middle school youth, the program is stream-lined and does not seem to take advantage of the most recent research about gangs. Also, an additional problem with this mass appeal is that the program operates inefficiently since it is given to all youth whether they are at risk for gang involvement or not.
Educators often see GREAT as a valuable tool for younger children. However, even they do not always agree that it reduces gang membership. Generally, the more gang-ridden an area that the school is in, the less belief there is that GREAT can affect gangs (Peterson & Esbensen, 2004). However, the GREAT program does receive community support, and is often viewed as a worthwhile investment given its low cost.

Unfortunately, its worth does not appear to include reducing the gang problem. Education-centric programs could be useful if delivered to a targeted audience and inclusive of specific examples. Gang and gang member biographies, which in most cases have tragic endings, can serve as a more effective deterrent than general gang research in that biographies create a personalized account and a real world example. These sorts of books are becoming increasingly available and could be beneficial in certain educational programs.

T. Teens on Target (TNT)

Teens on Target (TNT) is a non-profit initiative started in Oakland, California that has been in operation since 1989. This program began at a time when gun violence and gang activity were on the rise. The goal of TNT is to prevent violence (primarily involving guns) through intervention with at-risk youth. The program takes junior and senior-high school students and teaches them how to become leaders amongst their peers and advocates for non-violence. It includes weekly workshops and the use of positive role models. To date, the TNT program reports having trained over 800 peer educators and reached over 40,000 students in Oakland and Los Angeles – where a sister program is in place (TNT Homepage, 2007).

The TNT program claims a near 100 percent graduation rate for high school peer educators, as well as being involved in several anti-gun
initiatives throughout California (TNT Homepage, 2007). The TNT program has received recognition by the U.S. Department of Justice, won the California Peace Prize, and has received other awards for its effectiveness. This program shows that at-risk teenagers, if given the right tools and guidance, can be highly influential amongst their peers at reducing violent behavior – perhaps more-so than adults. The TNT program has no official crime data relative to its specific activities and youth, although there are multiple personal success stories to lend it credibility.

Ultimately, the TNT program displays how teenagers are willing and able to not only change their lives, but speak of this change to their friends; possibly creating a domino effect throughout the school and community. Similar programs that focus on individual youth would do well to take these initially targeted youth and employ them in such a way as to spread personal testimony and create relevance between the program and what’s going on in teens’ lives.

U. Alternative Schools

The traditional school system can reveal much more about its students than their academic performance. Students who drop-out, or even merely exhibit poor performance have been linked to greater chances of delinquency and gang membership. Therefore, if a youth does not succeed in this type of school environment, then they may seek to be successful elsewhere. Of course it would be better that success occur within a different type of school rather than being a successful gang member. Middle-school and high-school are viewed as one of the most important environments in which to address an emerging gang problem; especially when schools work closely with law enforcement and other outside organizations (Spergel et al., 1994). This collaboration can be through use of School Resource Officers (SROs), information sharing as
seen in truancy programs, or other activities.

Alternatives to “traditional” middle-school and high-school are becoming increasingly popular. As a group, these types of school cover a wide variety; be it an emphasis on one particular subject (e.g. arts or sciences), a vocational school, or simply an effort to create more personalized programs. No matter what the type, each alternative school model can appeal to a certain sect of teenagers that may feel unfulfilled by traditional schooling; redirecting their wandering away from delinquent activity and into a more personally interesting school.

One of the more current growing examples is The Met. First opened in 1996 in Providence, RI, the conceptual designers of The Met, Dennis Littky and Elliot Washor, recognized the relationship that neglect plays in students’ failure to graduate as well as engage in violent activity. Students who felt like they were not cared about would fade out of the system, often ending up in much worse scenarios. In his book, The Big Picture (2004), Littky feels that the school system is “one of the biggest perpetrators of neglect,” and he wanted his school to be “a little more human than most schools.”

The Met emphasizes a new “three R’s” to education: relationships, relevance, and rigor. This requires concentrated effort on the part of the advisors (teachers) to get to know kids personally and help them realize what matters in the “real world.” Discussions, presentations, papers, and internships are all major parts of academics at The Met. There is less use for letter grades, with the focus being more on performance reviews of students. The Met reports that 80 percent of its graduates immediately or eventually go to college, and has forty-four locations nation-wide (Big Picture homepage, 2007).

One other example of an alternative to traditional school is High Tech High (HTH). First begun in 2000, HTH is a project-oriented school that focuses more of its work on using the latest technology, with nearly all
classes structured to be hands-on in some way. The three stated goals of
the school are: personalization, adult world connection, and common
intellectual mission. HTH reports that 100 percent of its graduates are
accepted into college, and it has currently expanded to seven California
locations (HTH Homepage, 2007).

Despite having originated on opposite coasts of the country, these two
brief examples of alternative schools share many things in common:
personalization with students as a major goal, an emphasis on
internships through connections with various organizations, less letter-
grading and more performance reviews, and results that meet or exceed
state requirements. Depending on the resources of the state, replication
of these and other proven school models can give some youth a chance
to not only avoid dangers of delinquency personally, but also to grow and
contribute to society in a positive way for others. Showing the values of
work and education at an early age may reduce future delinquency, if
done in a way that can appeal to the students.

Keep in mind that these are only two of the most recent examples of
alternative schools. Many other models are being put to good use daily.
For some areas, the creation of a new school is too strenuous on the
available resources. In those cases, it could still benefit students to take
certain parts of these alternative school strategies and create specific
courses or programs that center on the ideologies and activities which
seem most important.

V. Bloomington, IL. (Spergel, Wa, Sosa, 2001)

The Bloomington study was the first to provide its program report.
Results from this report indicate that the program did not implement the
OJJDP model as planned, and instead had to resort to an alternative
model that emphasized suppression. This alternative was not due to lack
of community organization; the report states that “[the community] was
well-organized, fearful and threatened by the growing population of African-American youth identified as gang members, and adopted a punitive approach to the problem.” Here we see that a failure to understand gang youth can lead to emphasizing suppression over intervention strategies. Also due to this lack of understanding, some programs that were created did not address the most suitable needs for program youth.

Some failure of either collaboration or documented reporting was seen between the outreach street workers and the probation officers in that these two groups seemed to focus their attention on different categories of youth. Outreach workers contacted more African-American males whereas probation officers contacted more Hispanic and White males. This sort of disparity displays the importance of inter-agency cooperation. It could be that the most problematic category of youth shifted over the course of the program, or that changes in some individuals’ activities affected their frequency of contact. Either way, two groups that could have benefited from a close relationship did not appear to do so. This was even more important for Bloomington because of the programs which were used; probation/parole was seen to have the most effect on decreasing gang involvement.

In the researchers’ own words, problems with the Bloomington model, which should be kept in consideration regarding future implementation, were as follows:

- The OJJDP Model was not adopted, and an alternative local Bloomington-Normal model was implemented, one which over-emphasized suppression. Little attention was paid to the participation of grassroots community elements, and to the development of a youth-outreach approach that targeted gang youth in their hangouts at night and on weekends.

- A highly cohesive white community and its justice system and
school representatives sought primarily to suppress, isolate, and control African-American youth identified as gang members.

- Not all youth in the program were delinquent, or gang members, or at high risk.

- The youth who probably fared worst in the program were those who had no prior arrests. More of these program youth came to the attention of the police, and were more frequently arrested for a variety of generally minor crimes than were comparison youth who had no prior arrests.

- A highly cohesive white community characterized by a “moral panic” utilized the OJJDP Model and funds to enhance its proactive suppression approach, without adequate attention to the development of social and educational services, job training and placement and more socially-enlightened youth agency and police policies and procedures.

W. Mesa, AZ. (Spergel, Wa, Sosa, 2002)

The Mesa study claims that it was “successful in reducing the youth gang problem at the individual and Project-area levels.” This project area targeted teenage Latino males through intervention programs; most attention went to gang members on probation who were seen as less delinquent than others. Community mobilization was credited with being the most important part of the over all program. Members from more than thirty different city and community organizations were involved in a steering committee for what became known as the Mesa Gang Intervention Program (MGIP). However, the MGIP did not involve many grassroots organizations or use street-level workers.

The aforementioned claim of success in Mesa is not without question.
The same report also admits the following three results:

- The Project was apparently not successful in reducing the identification of program youth with their gangs.

- The program was associated with an increase in gang membership, and not being in the program was associated with a decrease in gang membership during the 1 to 1-¼-year interview period. In both samples, an increasing number of youth at Time II had become identified with smaller rather than major gangs.

- The Project did not have a significant effect on the reduction of gang membership in the program area, but might have had some dampening effect on the level of violence and property crimes among gangs in the program area.

The Mesa study largely equates juvenile delinquency with arrests; therefore the reduced arrests that were observed resulted in a reportedly successful program. Disregarding this one measure of success, the only other result that supports the claim of successfully conducting the program (which was admittedly not implemented in its entirety) was a reduction in “youth offenses, including gang-related offenses” of 10.4 percent more than “highly comparable” areas.

This data from the Mesa study helps to reveal other problems that were associated with the implementation of the Spergel Model. In particular, the lack of objective criteria as to how to define and measure the gang problem led to an arguably misconstrued report. An important lesson to be learned from this report is that the problem must be well-defined before beginning a program, and that definition must remain consistent throughout the program in order for accurate comparisons to be made. Adherence to the model could be achieved through an on-site coordinator.
The Riverside program site was an ideal location to target high levels of gang activity. Program implementation focused on two communities within the city having high rates of gang crime, using a third community for a comparison area. The number of these gangs varied greatly: being reported as 242 during funding for the Project, 400 gangs according to one police administrator after a couple years of the Project, over 700 gangs according to the media, and only 17 gangs were reported by the Riverside Police Department’s gang specialist by the end of the Project. Either the Riverside Project worked wonders in reducing the number of gangs and gang members, or here again we must face the inaccuracies associated with a lack of consensus about defining gangs and gang members.

The Riverside Project, which underwent some alterations in light of administrative change, achieved some success in collaboration between agencies and in providing valuable intervention programs for the targeted youth. A variety of ethnicities were involved in the Project, with almost all of them being referred by the juvenile probation department. Individual counseling was seen as more valuable for younger youth, while job training was reported by youth as the most favored program; these two program types were also the most commonly used for the Project. Crime data shows that over 75 percent of all the program youth involved reduced their arrest rate for violent crimes, yet gang membership remained unaffected.

The report for the Riverside Project states,

The available evidence suggests that the project did not reduce program youth’s membership and involvement in gangs relative to that of comparison youth during the course of the project period. There was no distinctive project effect on the size of gang membership in the program areas, based on interviews of program and comparison youth and observations of Riverside Police
Department Gang Unit officers. However, there was evidence that serious violence offenses, less-serious violence offenses, and property offenses did decline substantially across all areas of Riverside.

Thus, the Riverside project seemingly had a positive effect on the program youth in reducing juvenile delinquency, yet not on reported gang involvement. Nearly all of the program youth reported themselves as gang members, therefore the Riverside Project did an accurate job in its targeting. One possible reason for the failure to significantly reduce gang involvement is that while the program did well in targeting and finding particular services for youth, it did not appear to create any change in the communities in which the gangs thrived, nor did the programs appear to specifically speak about gangs.

Y. San Antonio, TX (Spergel, Wa, Sosa, 2004a)

The program site in San Antonio, TX suffered from a slow start and lack of committed involvement by the San Antonio Police Department (SAPD). The youth involved in the project, known as the Gang Rehabilitation, Assessment and Service Program (GRAASP), were almost entirely Latino males. The most commonly used intervention program was individual counseling, followed by job related and school related services. These intervention efforts by outreach workers and case managers were the dominant aspect of GRAASP.

Due to this emphasis on social-services, “the appropriate balance of strategies and services by the different types of workers in some interrelated way...was not achieved in San Antonio.” This imbalance of strategies may have been due to the lack of support received from the SAPD and other areas. Arrests and general gang numbers did decrease during the years of this project, however this decline was in accordance with an existing trend and mirrored in the comparison area. In the end,
the San Antonio's GRAASP produced no significant effect on either arrests or gang involvement for program youth. The ineffectiveness in this project site was apparently due to a failure to support the Spergel Model through a wide variety of organizations. The Bloomington project site had to focus primarily on suppression because of an over-emphasis on law enforcement, yet San Antonio, due to a lack of commitment by law enforcement, over-emphasized social-services.

Z. Tucson, AZ (Spergel, Wa, Sosa, 2004b)

The Tucson project site, similar to the four previous sites involved in the initial implementation of the Spergel Model, did not achieve statistically significant results in reducing arrests or gang involvement. The lead agency for the Tucson site was Our Town Family Center – an agency primarily involved in social services. The main three services provided were group counseling, case planning, and individual counseling. As the report states,

> The program focus was on social-support services within the walls of the Our Town facility, and less on balanced social-intervention and control strategies. A team approach involving social-service and suppression-type workers in collaborative planning and action around particular youth or gang-problem situations in the community was not developed.

Other agencies provided limited or “token” support at best, thus causing Tucson to face much the same problem as San Antonio. Also, past denial of a gang problem resulted in both insufficient data and no clear coordination between groups. The development of an inter-agency system of communication “was never adequately addressed in the course of the program.”
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